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Abstract 
EU and national policy-makers argue that the single services market is a key to EU growth, 
but that many barriers to services market access remain. Grasping the scope, nature and 
economic meaning of these barriers, however, has proven rather difficult. This is exactly what 
the present CEPS Special Report helps the reader to do. We trace all market access barriers in 
services, as far as the data allow, and attempt to understand their nature and economic 
meaning (given that they are usually forms of domestic regulation) and discuss aspects of the 
measurement of restrictiveness. We make a sharp distinction between market access barriers 
restrictions in a non-EU WTO/GATS environment and intra-EU ones, and demonstrate the 
significant difference in ambition between the two. The paper specifies in detail the progress 
made by the EU's horizontal reform in services markets, documenting the removal of many 
cross-border obstacles to trade in services and establishment. Finally, following these 
conceptual and descriptive analyses, a brief assessment of access restrictiveness indices is 
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Federica Mustilli and Jacques Pelkmans* 
CEPS Special Report No. 77 / June 2013 
1.  Purpose and structure 
When empirically verifying the determinants of international exchange in services and the 
impact on productivity (growth), it is crucial to have a good idea of the nature, variation and 
intensity of the barriers to market access. This paper attempts to map such barriers, to trace 
them, especially in the EU, to understand their nature and economic meaning and to discuss 
measurement issues. None of these four aspects turns out to be easy. We hope that the paper 
can facilitate a better understanding of the manifold barriers to services exchange – drawing a 
sharp distinction between those barriers in the non-EU WTO environment and intra-EU 
barriers today – as well as identify in some detail and assess the remaining barriers in the 
EU’s internal market for services. A brief discussion of efforts to quantify access barriers to 
services markets is included as well.  
The structure of this CEPS Special Report is as follows. Section 2 reminds the reader of 
some basic preliminaries of any analysis on services barriers: i) the four modes of services 
exchange over borders and how they relate to one another; ii) services barriers as the 
consequence of domestic ‘regulation’ and hence how ‘barriers’ have everything to do with the 
(economic) justification of ‘why regulate?’; and iii) extending this crucial point, identifying 
the ‘roots’ of services barriers, distinguishing the EU  from the GATS (General Agreement on 
Trade in Services). Section 3 discusses the issue of the (right?) classification of services 
barriers, of course again distinguishing between international and intra-EU approaches. We 
show that there are several ways to classify barriers horizontally, but it is also important to 
zoom in on sectoral barriers, which can imply an incredible refinement of the analysis (we 
show this with an example of international restrictions of airline services). Assuming that the 
reader has a solid grasp of the internal market logic of the EU,
1 we refrain from further 
reminders on this topic in section 4 and provide an in-depth analysis of the EU’s horizontal 
services Directive 2006/123 (sometimes called the Bolkestein Directive). Although the core 
of this horizontal directive is a mere codification of CJEU case law on services, its interesting 
implementation process has eliminated or constrained a large number of national regulatory 
instruments hindering cross-border services trade or restricting, and perhaps even blocking, 
establishment of foreign (but EU) services providers. Section 5 gives an overview of the 
                                                 
* Federica Mustilli and Jacques Pelkmans are Researcher and Senior Fellow, respectively, in the Regulatory 
Affairs research unit at CEPS. This study draws on the findings of the SERVICEGAP FP7 project, in which 
CEPS participated as a principal partner. The project carried out a comprehensive investigation into the impact 
of market services on aggregate economic growth in the EU and its comparative performance relative to 
competitor regions. For more information on SERVICEGAP and its findings, see its website 
(www.servicegap.org). 
1 We refer to two compact surveys. For design and development of the EU single market, including the internal 
market logic, see Pelkmans (2011a) and for the economic impact literature on it, see Pelkmans (2011b).  2 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
entire EU regulatory regime in services, that is, not only activities falling under the services 
Directive but also six regulated domains (such as financial services, transport, etc.), without 
going into excessive detail. We identify what barriers remain in these sectors. In section 6, we 
survey four indices of services barriers restrictiveness (including one on regulatory 
heterogeneity) and related approaches for assessing, if not quantifying, the impact on trade 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) and possibly economic welfare. To keep the paper 
manageable, the focus will be on the indices (including an annex) and what they can and 
cannot tell us, especially inside the EU. Section 7 concludes.  
2.  Preliminaries when analysing services barriers 
2.1  On the modes of services exchange 
Services are different from goods and cross-border services exchange is very different from 
cross-border trade in goods. Any attempt to understand barriers to services exchange across 
borders begins here. It is so crucial because the barriers to services exchange need not 
necessarily be distinct from those in goods,
2 but their relevance and economic meaning may 
differ a lot. These distinctions have profound implications for both a qualitative and 
quantitative economic comprehension of services barriers. 
Whereas almost all goods are tradable, services can be tradable or non-tradable by their 
nature. Whereas – in official WTO parlance – ‘trade in goods’ is typically separated from 
other ways of serving foreign market X, such as licensing a local company or local production 
via direct investment, in services (four) different modes of serving a foreign market are 
considered together in the GATS. This is equally true in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), ever since the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Thus, the EU distinguishes 
three modes of cross-border trade in services: i) pure trade at a distance, nowadays mainly via 
e-commerce or other electronic means; ii) consumer crosses the border and iii) supplier 
crosses the border (for temporary service provision).
3 The fourth EU mode consists of cross-
border direct investment based on the ‘right of establishment’, which translates in the GATS 
as the mode of ‘commercial presence’. This FDI mode should normally be a lasting form of 
service provision as it involves a considerable equity/ownership stake.  
For services, FDI (or ‘commercial presence’) for local provision of services is 
frequently the only viable way to do business across borders. This is certainly correct for all 
services that have to be consumed and produced at the same time and that require close and 
repeated interaction with clients. There is a borderline here with the temporary provision of 
cross-border services (e.g. consultancy or architectural services but also renovation of houses 
or premises). Put differently, there are only a few categories of services that can be supplied 
to non-incidental clients from a distance.
4 Moreover, many services and, in particular more 
sophisticated or highly-skilled services, require a good deal of trust on the part of clients and 
this in turn may well be based on a credible commitment of the supplier expressed in local 
presence via FDI (and local staff). The implication is straightforward: official terms of market 
access cannot fully explain whether the entry into a given market will work, even for services 
providers that have been successful elsewhere. Earning trust is elusive, often localised, but 
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3 In the GATS, this is called the ‘movement of natural persons’ for the provision of services.  
4 The reader should also note that when a service is inherently non-tradable, it is nevertheless quite possible to 
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nevertheless a very real issue. Whereas in goods, the issue is merely likely to consist of 
catering to the preferences of local clients, market penetration for many services may be far 
more difficult. Nevertheless, such difficulties need not be due to ‘barriers’.  
Another implication of these elementary aspects is often ignored: in statistics,
5 policy 
debates (e.g. on the draft EU services Directive, now enacted as Dir. 2006/123) and empirical 
economic approaches, there is a stubborn inclination to focus on cross-border ‘trade’ (flows, 
in the sense of the three modes), thereby neglecting the FDI mode for local provision. Since 
the latter mode of provision often comes more natural to services (as compared to goods), 
there is little doubt that neglecting this mode is a serious omission. Moreover, as Kox & 
Nordås (2007) have shown empirically, barriers can have an effect on more than one mode 
and modes can be substitutes and/or complements. Finally, the local provision of services 
from foreign affiliates is almost certainly far more important economically than cross-border 
trade.
6 
2.2  Understanding barriers means understanding domestic regulation 
Services markets may suffer from a host of market failures. Therefore, many services are 
regulated. Services markets may also be regulated for social reasons or with a view to throttle 
competition. In the world economy more generally, this kind of regulation is typically 
domestic. There is very little international regulation; at best, there may be basic principles or 
broad agreement not to intervene in certain ways, which originate from international 
institutions (as in the GATS). In GATS negotiations, these general principles are 
complemented by specific (market access) ‘commitments’ per WTO country. In the EU, 
however, this is very different indeed. Insofar as services are regulated, they tend to be 
regulated at two levels of government: the EU level and the national level, sometimes 
regional and local, too. What is important to the EU situation and markedly different from 
worldwide exchange in services is that free movement and free FDI (establishment) in 
services across intra-EU borders is guaranteed, with a supranational enforcement regime 
implemented by the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). Also, EU competition policy plays a significant role. This combination of intra-EU 
‘free exchange’, EU regulation and EU competition policy yields a market environment that is 
radically distinct from worldwide exchange. And yet, there are still barriers in the EU services 
markets, albeit far less than (say) a decade ago, let alone two decades ago. Further progress in 
breaking down barriers inside the EU services markets is expected from the developments 
around the services Directive and ongoing initiatives (e.g. the Digital Agenda, etc.).  
A word on market failures, which prompt regulation. There are basically four types of 
‘market failures’, three of which apply to services: internalities, imperfections of competition 
(including forms of market power), externalities and public goods. Public goods are 
inapplicable, unless one wishes to go so far as to say that ‘knowledge creation’ is a highly-
skilled service with public goods characteristics requiring regulation (or subsidies).  
Table 1 gives a (non-exhaustive) overview of market failures in services, some of the 
best known features and frequently used remedies. Since there are no tariffs or indeed no 
                                                 
5 FATS (local service provision by foreign affiliates) statistics have received more attention recently, but the 
quality of FATS are still problematic.  
6 Francois & Hoekman (2010, p. 655) cite estimates that, in 2005, sales of services by US foreign affiliates ($530 
billion) were almost 50% larger than cross-border services exports ($360 billion). For the EU, Peter Smith, in his 
PhD dissertation at Leuven University (KUL), has found similar indications, with perhaps an even larger ratio.  4 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
border measures stricto sensu applying to services, the remedies in Table 1 are likely to be on 
the basis of ‘barriers to services exchange’ across borders 
Table 1. Overview of market failures in services  
Market failures  Features  Frequently used remedies 
















- Market-based guarantees and 
transparency 
- Credible signalling via collective 
action of specialised providers (self-
regulation) 
- Self-regulation, based on framework 
laws 
- Regulation, setting minimum 
standards for companies and/or 
individuals (e.g. diplomas and 
licensing) 
- Technical regulation (e.g. taxi meters) 
- Conduct rules (offsetting imperfectly 
observable information; non-repetitive) 
- Self-regulation and regulation to 
ensure ‘quality’ 





Barriers to entry 
 









- Due to regulation and self-regulation 
(if ill-designed) 
- Due to discrimination (denial of 
‘national treatment’) 
- Entry barriers may be intangible in 
that ‘switching costs’ between old and 
new providers can be near-prohibitive, 
if ‘experience’ and tradition correlates 
strongly with ‘trust’ 
- Effective anti-trust law and 
enforcement 
Externalities  Via goods delivery bank runs 
or contagion via interlinkages 





Intra-firm skill enhancement 
(education)  
- Logistics/transport regulation 
- Systemic risk (financial stability) 
regulation and supervision [and funds 
for ‘bank resolution’] 
- Network industries regulation 
(gas/electricity, broadcasting, 
telecoms/internet, air and rail) 
- Preventing failure of collective action 
(e.g. poaching) via (self-) regulation 
(usually in sectors) 
 
All these remedies for market failures are, at the same time, in international terms 
‘beyond the border’ measures. Only in the EU can the remedies be found at two levels of 
government: if at EU level, this might mean that no barriers remain between EU countries, or, 
at times, fewer barriers remain. In actual practice, EU member states retain considerable ACCESS BARRIERS TO SERVICES MARKETS | 5 
discretion in services regulation and supervision, and further centralisation has proven to be 
sensitive. At times, subsidiarity suggests that local diversity can justify national regulation to 
be kept so as to cater for local preferences. 
If regulation is properly designed and justified by market failures, it cannot be argued 
that objectionable ‘barriers’ to services exchange have emerged. Even if one might legally 
define them as ‘barriers’, they are justified by the overcoming of market failures. This is 
recognised both in EU and GATS law. And one crucial element of being ‘properly designed’ 
is undoubtedly whether or not such measures are specified in a non-discriminatory manner: 
discrimination of foreign providers may be prompted by a lack of competitiveness but is 
surely not justified by market failures. Non-discriminatory measures in services can 
nevertheless render market access onerous, if not quasi-impossible, in a number of more or 
less ingenious ways. In the EU, this tends to be minimised by the application of the 
proportionality principle; in GATS by asking for the ‘least-restrictive’ way of intervening. 
Still, the two should not be seen as more or less equivalent: the EU imposes ‘free movement’ 
of services across intra-EU borders as well as the (company’s) ‘right of establishment’ as 
fundamental rights for any EU economic agent, whereas the GATS merely assesses, or at 
least can assess in panels and the Appellate Body, whether the barrier is the least-restrictive 
one, yet without the right of having market access (as in the EU). Many barriers that are 
unlikely ever to be challenged in the GATS would not survive inside the EU. 
Moreover, the EU (again, unlike the GATS) has pursued extensive ‘harmonisation’, that 
is, EU regulation overcoming market failures, thereby taking away the justification of 
member states to insist on national regulation in this respect. Hence, insofar as EU regulation 
deals with these aspects sufficiently in detail, no intra-EU barriers can arise. Finally, even if 
intra-EU barriers to services exchange might linger despite free movement/establishment and 
despite common regulation, there is supranational enforcement via the Commission as the 
‘guardian of the treaty’ and, ultimately, by the CJEU. It goes without saying that, irrespective 
of the quality of analysis and the authority of the Appellate Body, the CJEU is incomparably 
more powerful to remove lingering but unjustified barriers to services.  
Last but not least, barriers to services exchange might also arise from market power as 
implied by Table 1. The remedy is to go for an effective national competition policy. Once 
again, in the EU that is very different from the GATS. The EU has a fairly tough EU-level 
competition policy, with a wide scope, plus rather similar national competition policies. 
Neither of the two exists, even embryonically, in the GATS, although, of course, some WTO 
partners do enjoy national competition policies on their own initiative which might help to 
reduce market power as a barrier to market access. Since the so-called ‘Singapore issues’ 
(including basic principles for national competition policies of WTO members) have been 
banned from the Doha Round, the only embryonic beginning of international competition 
policy can be found in some bilateral trade agreements. For all practical purposes, therefore, 
only the EU can remove barriers to (intra-EU) services exchange arising from (nationally 
held) market power. 
2.3  The roots of barriers to services exchange  
Barriers to services exchange, whether cross-border services trade or FDI (establishment), are 
mainly rooted in regulatory costs for a foreign business to access a (national) market. In some 
cases, market power (hence, insufficient competition policy) may cause a barrier, but in actual 
practice this market power usually emerges or is retained due to the regulatory environment 
(e.g. in network industries or exclusionary privileges in distribution). Hence, the market might 6 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
not be contestable for either domestic or foreign entrants. Strong market power in liberalised 
sectors without any regulatory protection is rare and we shall ignore it for present purposes.  
Services barriers typically consist of ‘behind-the-border’ regulatory measures, and most 
of such measures are ‘non-price’ in character. In the few cases where minimum prices would 
be imposed but the market is otherwise ‘open’, there is the possibility of throttling import 
competition or discouraging FDI (as the incentives to compete locally e.g. on price might be 
lost). Other cases of price regulation might include regulated prices for public transport for 
reasons of income (re)distribution and/or to control input prices of other sectors using the 
service as an input (hence, to protect competitiveness), as well as price regulation by national 
regulators in some network industries – usually at the retail level – to protect consumers from 
excessive market power. When prices are regulated, it becomes extremely difficult to 
generalise about the ‘justification’ of such measures. Once again, the EU stands out as 
special: price regulation in services that affects, actually or potentially, intra-EU cross-border 
trade are forbidden except in network industries
7 and possibly in specific instances of some 
professional services. The reason is that price regulation for not-purely-local services would 
violate ‘free movement’. In the GATS or otherwise, there are no disciplines in this respect 
and countries are free to impose price regulation if they so choose. 
It is quite another matter, however, whether that is sound regulatory policy. In terms of 
‘Better Regulation’ principles and e.g. OECD Guidelines, there are usually better alternative 
ways to address the underlying problem, without throttling or distorting market incentives. 
Where countries have modernised regulation and wish to promote more market-driven 
policies, without giving up societal objectives, one will observe that such types of regulation 
are typically reduced over time, and, by implication, the barriers to services exchange. The 
OECD PMR indicators available since 1998 show this phenomenon clearly.
8 
The vast majority of services barriers are barriers caused by (non-price) domestic 
regulation. These can be discriminatory (to foreign services suppliers) or not, and they can be 
‘justified’ by market failures or not (hence, ‘protectionist’). However, even when justified by 
market failures, countries might nonetheless do this in different ways and this ‘regulatory 
heterogeneity’ in itself generates costs of market access, and hence, barriers. Table 2 attempts 
to clarify this taxonomy. As the table shows, there are distinct roots to ‘barriers’. Hence, 
removing barriers will require distinct strategies with different requirements. The third 
column is about protecting incumbent domestic service suppliers against new entrants, 
without a justification in terms of SHEIC (market failures endangering Safety, Health, 
Environment, Investor and Consumer protection). This is called ‘arbitrary’ in WTO and EU 
treaty language. The new entrants may be foreign or domestic or both. If regulation excludes 
foreign business or raises their cost of access in ways that do not apply to local new entrants 
or incumbents, it is discriminatory, which is strictly forbidden in the EU and strongly 
discouraged in GATS (via the ‘national treatment’ commitment). Even if non-discriminatory, 
incumbents frequently are arbitrarily protected against the threat of new entry, by banning it 
or making it (much?) more costly for the latter. When countries pursue or maintain such 
arbitrary anti-competitive regulation, one cannot reasonably expect that they will be interested 
in ‘equivalence’ with similar anti-competitive regulation in other countries. Such an interest is 
inherently associated with policy intentions to open up markets in a two-way fashion. 
                                                 
7 Or, more generally, in so-called SGEIs (Services of General Economic Interest, Art. 106/2, TFEU). Most 
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gambling regulation (against gambling addiction) as an SGEI.  
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Therefore, the right-middle entry in Table 2 is purely theoretical. Once all countries would 
strive for ‘equivalence’ in regulation, (the barriers from) ‘regulatory heterogeneity’ would be 
significantly reduced. What would remain, as long as ‘harmonisation’ is avoided or 
impossible, would be the inevitable costs for market access, justified by the overcoming of 
market failures. We shall return to ‘regulatory heterogeneity’ in section 6.  
Table 2. When does (non-price) domestic service regulation cause barriers? 
  Justified by market failures  Not justified (arbitrary) 
Discriminating against foreign 
entrants 
BARRIER to services 
exchange; note, discrimination 
itself is not justified 
BARRIER to services 
exchange 
Plain protectionism 
Non-discriminatory  NO barrier, if (and only if) all 
countries enact / maintain 
equivalent regulation, via 
harmonisation or voluntary 
adherence to agreed (world or 
EU) standards 
BARRIER, even if all countries 
enact/maintain equivalent 
regulation (which seems 
implausible anyway)  
Non-discriminatory, but with 
‘regulatory heterogeneity’ 
between countries 
BARRIER, due to the lack of 
harmonisation or of reference 
to agreed standards 
BARRIER 
 
(arbitrary + non-equivalence) 
 
The second column assumes regulation to be justified by the overcoming of widely 
recognised market failures (SHEIC). For regulation of market structure or conduct to be in the 
public interest, it ought to be SHEIC-based and means other than regulation should ideally be 
employed to pursue other goals (e.g. redistribution). This column shows how demanding 
barrier-free services exchange really is. If SHEIC-based regulation is properly designed, that 
is, geared solely to the SHEIC objectives, because only they matter for overcoming market 
failures, there is no place for discrimination of foreigners – after all, they would be subject to 
the same regulation protecting SHEIC objectives. Thus, the upper-left entry is due to ill-
designed regulation and removing barriers would begin by taking out discrimination. If 
SHEIC-based regulation is non-discriminatory, however, a mere necessary condition is 
fulfilled for eliminating barriers. It is not sufficient. Although there may be some convergence 
about what SHEIC would mean in actual practice, it does not follow that, a priori, SHEIC 
objectives are genuinely equivalent. If objectives differ, one must expect the impact of 
regulatory instruments on foreign new entrants interested to access different markets to be 
different for every new market. This means that the fixed costs of market access for each and 
every national market are positive, and possibly significant. Reducing such natural ‘regulatory 
heterogeneity’ would imply a voluntary convergence of objectives, such that ‘equivalence’ 
would be recognised, or, more ambitiously, that forms of legally binding harmonisation of 
objectives is undertaken. 
In the WTO, harmonisation of objectives of services regulation is absent (seen as far too 
intrusive for ‘sovereign’ countries), although weak attempts in this direction have been 
undertaken in the areas of financial services and telecoms services on a voluntary basis. 
However, there is more. In relatively heavily regulated services sectors, the methods chosen 
and the instruments selected for pursuing the objectives also matter a lot. Thus, even if there 
would be a significant degree of regulatory convergence with respect to objectives, all 
justified by SHEIC, the panoply of instruments and the methods employed might nevertheless 
differ time and again between countries, with the result that market access will entail non-
trivial and fixed access costs for each and every national target market. Inside the EU, 8 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
common regulation (harmonisation) is an accepted practice and this offers much greater 
opportunities to reduce or minimise regulatory heterogeneity of justified national services 
regulation.  
Nevertheless, the lesson from many years of services regulation in the Union is that EU 
member states (and even regions) retain considerable discretion in services regulation, 
implementation and enforcement, even in the presence of an appreciable amount of common 
regulation. And where national regulatory agencies (e.g. in network industries) or supervision 
are relevant, it remains extremely difficult to render all of it consistent throughout the EU and 
equivalent for business. The Services Directive 2006/123 has undoubtedly reduced regulatory 
heterogeneity somewhat in the domains with relatively light regulatory requirements (see 
section 4). In more heavily regulated services sectors like financial services, network sectors 
and professional services, there are still many signals that regulatory heterogeneity is rather 
high, and hence, an obstacle to market access. Nevertheless, one should not forget that the EU 
does not only dispose of common services regulation, but also of highly intrusive ‘free 
movement/establishment’ (actively protected by CJEU judicial review) and EU competition 
policy. None of the three applies internationally. This can only mean that, despite a tendency 
in many parts of the world to attempt ‘better regulation’ focused on SHEIC objectives and to 
avoid arbitrary services regulation, regulatory heterogeneity is bound to remain a major 
problem for GATS-based market access.  
3.  Classification of services barriers in the world economy 
3.1  Distinguishing between intra-EU barriers and world services barriers 
Although the literature comprises several attempts to classify ‘barriers’ to services exchange, 
the complexity and detail of the many measures, often in the form of domestic regulation, 
have so far inhibited the convergence towards a unique classification.
9 The main reason for 
this is that ‘behind-the-border’ measures of domestic regulation, procedures (including red 
tape) and other aspects such as taxation are characterised by a virtually infinite variation in 
instruments, intensity and degrees of (un)certainty (given administrative discretion). This 
enormous complexity also implies a firm warning that quantitative economic studies of 
services barriers and the impact of their removal amount to a truly heroic exercise (see 
sections 6 and 7) because one is forced to employ methods and simplifications that cannot 
possibly do justice to the business reality of these barriers.  
A crucial distinction ought to be made between services barriers among WTO trading 
partners
10 and barriers inside the EU (or the EEA).
11 The EU internal market consists of 
fundamental obligations for member states, hence ‘rights’ for companies and other economic 
agents. These do not exist internationally. Critical here are ‘free movement of services’ 
(unless explicitly derogated, with justification) and the ‘right of establishment’ (with almost 
no derogations). GATS language might here and there give the impression that its text seems 
inspired by the EU and broader (GATT-type) principles (including ‘non-discrimination’, 
                                                 
9 Important recent contributions include Francois & Hoekman (2010) and WTO (2012).  
10 In this paper we ignore non-WTO countries. 
11 The EU-Switzerland bilaterals (some 140 agreements) are largely about services (but very little about some 
financial services). These bilaterals should mimic the EEA, but in actual practice, they fall short of the EEA. The 
special case of Switzerland will not be elaborated here. For details on the EEA of today and the link with 
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equivalence, national treatment) but the crux of the matter is what ‘commitments’ have been 
written in the GATS schedules. The commitments in GATS hardly approximate those in the 
EU. Moreover, the EU’s powerful, often horizontal principles are carefully monitored as to 
their application (or infringement), complaints are relatively easy to file,
12 the European 
Commission often initiates infringement procedures as the ‘guardian of the treaty’ and the 
supreme CJEU exercises judicial review, at times with sanctions.
13 None of these elements 
would find a counterpart at the GATS level.  
In the EU of today, free movement and establishment have prompted far-reaching 
common regulation (and supervision as well) in several large services sectors, again without 
any parallel at the GATS level, and indeed without parallel in all bilateral or plurilateral free 
trade agreements (FTAs) in the world. Yet another crucial difference with the GATS is the 
EU (supranational) case law on services exchange in the internal market which is enormous 
and very subtle.
14 As an illustration, an authoritative survey of the EU case law on services 
(Hatzopoulos & Do, 2006) of a period of only five years (from 2000 to 2005) dealt with some 
150 judgments of the CJEU! One explanation of this intense recourse to the CJEU at the time 
was the lack of political initiative in Brussels on horizontal regulation of services until around 
2004. Meanwhile, the horizontal services Directive 2006/123 has come into force and this has 
considerably tightened the discipline on member states’ exceptions to free movement and 
establishment. We shall summarise the essentials of this horizontal directive in section 4 and 
hope to clarify (in sections 4 and 5) what the (remaining) scope is for restrictions of services 
trade in the single market as well as for restricting FDI in services in other member states.  
Many restrictions that are forbidden in the EU remain possible under GATS due to a 
lack of national commitments in the GATS schedules. And the many preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) hardly change that. From a number of surveys on bilateral/regional FTAs 
in the world (see e.g. Mattoo & Sauve, 2008), it has become clear that few such regional 
trading agreements go (much) beyond GATS commitments. In summarising the literature, 
Dee (2009) notes that “…in many dimensions PTAs are not as liberal on average as WTO 
agreements. This is in part because some PTAs have no substantive services provisions at all 
– only a minority of the agreements between developing countries have such provisions. It is 
also because many PTAs are silent on issues like domestic regulation, monopolies, private 
business practices, safeguards and subsidies….But on the two core issues of market access 
and national treatment, PTAs are now more liberal on average than the WTO… largely 
because of ….disciplines on a negative rather than a positive list basis” (p. 4). Heydon & 
Woolcock (2009), in their careful analysis, warn against the term ‘GATS-plus’ as being 
difficult to apply, but broadly perceive a trend of PTAs getting a little more inclusive with 
respect to services, but with many reservations and exceptions.  
Therefore, we shall structure this section as follows. First, several economic 
classifications of services barriers in the world will be provided, based on available literature 
(section 3.2). Two illustrations of sectoral restrictions will be provided in much greater detail 
                                                 
12 In services some 880 complaints were registered by the Commission in 2010, for example. This is an estimate 
from Table 1.1.A in SEC(2011) 1094 of 29 September 2011, p. 5 by adding complaints to the DGs internal 
market and services, mobility and transport, information society and media, education and culture and health and 
consumers.  
13 In Pelkmans & Correia de Brito (2012), an empirical survey is provided of a range of other EU enforcement 
instruments that have significantly improved compliance in terms of speed and lower enforcement costs both for 
business and citizens. 
14 For an authoritative and very detailed survey of CJEU services case law, see Hatzopoulos (2012). 10 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
(3.3) (namely, banking and air transport) and, in turn, one of these (air transport) will be 
further disaggregated in order to illustrate the enormous finesse of services regulation and 
procedures (3.4 and Annex 1).  
3.2  An economic classification of barriers to services exchange  
In (GATS) mode 1, services are provided over borders at a distance and, for all practical 
purposes, this is (normally) not requiring a movement of factors of production across borders. 
In all other modes, either the provider or a temporary worker (who provides/executes the 
service) moves, or the consumer moves, or the provider enters the market with a view to 
establish a subsidiary supplying local services. In other words, except for pure trade, persons 
move (and this may be hindered by visa, diploma issues, etc.), workers from a service 
provider move (and this may be hindered by a range of administrative requirements and 
subjected to additional costs) or companies (with capital in various forms) move, and often 
persons in the company have to overcome separate barriers when going ‘with’ the company.  
As noted, services are not and cannot be protected by tariffs. The barriers can be 
usefully distinguished (e.g. Dee, 2005; Dee & Hanslow, 2002) between ‘tariff-like barriers’ 
and ‘resource costs increasing barriers’.
15 The former lead to price hikes of services, not 
because resource costs have gone up but due to artificially created scarcity (the potential 
‘foreign’ supply curve is pushed to the left), with the economic rents going to incumbents. 
Like tariffs, these barriers are discriminatory between incumbents and foreign providers. The 
latter increase the resource costs of doing business in the target market, for instance, by 
requirements that ‘level the playing field’ for professionals (if no equivalence of competences 
is accepted, additional training or exams might be needed). If such types of measures are an 
expression of (too?) heavy regulation, liberalisation may remove what is excessive 
(disproportional) in these requirements.  
This is tantamount to a vertical shift down the supply curve, associated with technical 
efficiency gains (i.e. rectangles over the entire volume of output). Such efficiency gains are 
equivalent to a productivity hike, benefiting incumbents via the lowering of costs, benefiting 
foreign entrants by easing access and lowering costs for local users. Welfare rectangles tend 
to be a multiple of welfare triangles, partly because their base is the entire volume of output 
unlike for welfare triangles, and hence, liberalisation via domestic reforms can be highly 
beneficial and facilitate market access in services. On the other hand, liberalisation of ‘tariff-
like’ barriers will inevitably reduce or eliminate ‘rents’ and this redistributive effect is likely 
to be resisted. Thus, the strength of the non-discrimination principle is found in the ‘apolitical 
way’ it is capable of reducing services barriers, despite likely resistance of incumbents. Note 
that the economic impact of barriers to market access for services not only hinges on this 
distinction between tariff-like barriers and resource-cost-increasing barriers. As Deardorff & 
Stern (2008, pp. 174–178) show in a graphical analysis, it also matters whether the domestic 
services sector is competitive or not, whether the domestic and foreign entrants’ services are 
readily substitutable and whether or not the domestic incumbent has monopoly power. 
An often-quoted classification (Hoekman & Braga, 1997) of barriers to services trade 
groups restrictions into four classes, as shown in Table 3. 
 
                                                 
15 This distinction goes back at least to Pelkmans & Winters (1988), analysing the economic impact of EC1992. ACCESS BARRIERS TO SERVICES MARKETS | 11 
Table 3. Barriers to services exchange, basic classification 
Barriers Examples 
1. Quotas, local 
content, prohibitions 
Quotas usually apply to the providers, so do prohibitions (although 
services as such are sometimes forbidden too); quotas and local content 




Examples include visa fees, annual residence fees, entry or exit taxes, 
discriminatory port fees, but also price-regulation for certain services 
(e.g. telecoms local services).  
3. Standards, licensing 
and public procurement 
Licensing/certification often impose limitations on the ‘right to exercise 
the business’ in an operational sense; this may well be accompanied by 
an ‘economic needs’ test, applied – more often than not – by the 
incumbent competitors; standards of how to conduct the business might 
imply ‘raising rivals’ cost’ measures, again throttling competition; public 
procurement may be (outright) discriminatory by an allowed price margin 
(as in the Buy American Act) or by large discretion in procedures. 
4. Discriminatory 
access to distribution 
networks 
Examples can be found in network industries but also in advertising and 
dealer networks. 
 
The main drawback of the classification in Table 3 is that it refers mostly to 
discriminatory measures,
16 whereas non-discriminatory measures can also be restrictive and 
serve as barriers to access (as is known from the economics of ‘raising rivals’ costs’). It is 
also blending the pure trade aspect and the establishment aspect. Linking the classification of 
barriers with the economic analysis of their restrictive impact is hard. The literature 
approaches measures often from a legal or administrative perspective, rather than economic. 
However, when it is economic, a paradox appears: classifications of barriers focus mainly on 
FDI and operational restrictions once established, whereas the empirical economic analysis of 
services exchange is almost always based on cross-border trade statistics.  
This is exemplified in a well-known UNCTAD (1996) classification, summarised in a 
more aggregate way by Deardorff & Stern (2008, p. 182) and reproduced in Table 4. It 
distinguishes three main classes of barriers to foreign direct investment in services: 
restrictions on market entry, ownership and control restrictions and operational restrictions. 
The early work on the EU internal market for services during the Lisbon strategy has 
(rightly) paid attention to a quite different economic perspective to barriers in services 
exchange: How do barriers cumulate over six stages of the value chain in services provision? 
The greater the cumulation of barriers, the more discouraged cross-border business will be, 
even when some or many individual barriers would seem to be manageable. This is 
particularly problematic because different services – especially for cross-border business – are 
intricately intertwined and barriers in one stage of the provision chain will tend to engender 
knock-on effects throughout the chain. Box 1 summarises the classification of barriers in the 
internal services market over six stages. 
                                                 
16 The focus on non-discriminatory access barriers is critical for the EU internal services market, since 
discriminatory ones are strictly forbidden (see further). However, the authoritative survey by Francois & 
Hoekman (2010) and the one by the WTO (2012) still heavily rely on addressing discriminatory services barriers 
in the non-EU WTO environment. Indeed, so much so that they “use the term liberalisation to mean deliberate 
actions that reduce discrimination” (Francois & Hoekman, 2010, p. 659).  12 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
Table 4. Barriers to foreign direct investment in services  
Restrictions Examples 
Market entry  Bans on foreign investment in certain sectors 
  Quantitative restrictions (e.g. no more than 25 % foreign ownership in a 
sector) 
  Screening and approval (can be based on ‘national interest’ or ‘net economic 
benefits (or ‘needs’) test’) 
  Restrictions on the legal form of the foreign entity 
  Minimum capital requirements 
  Conditions on subsequent investments 
 Conditions  on  location 
 Admission  taxes 
Ownership and control   Compulsory joint ventures with domestic investors 
  Limits on the number of foreign board members 
  Government appointed board members 
  Government approval required for certain decisions 
 Restrictions  on  foreign shareholders’ rights 
  Mandatory transfer of some ownership to locals within e.g. 15 years 
Operational   Performance requirements (e.g. on exports) (see TRIMs in WTO) 
 Local  content  restrictions 
  Restrictions on import of labour, capital and raw materials 
  Operational permits or licences 
  Ceilings on royalties 
  Restrictions on repatriation of capital and/or profits 
Sources: UNCTAD (1996), as adapted by Deardorff & Stern (2008) and by the authors. 
Box 1. Barriers over six stages of services provision 
1. Establishment of services providers 
Monopolies and quotas, nationality/residence requirements, authorisation/registration, restrictions 
on multi-disciplinary activities, legal form and internal structure of firms, professional 
qualifications, line-of-business restrictions (including discriminatory taxes) 
2. Use of inputs for services provision 
Posting of workers for temporary services, use of employment agencies of other EU countries, other 
complications related to the cross-border deployment of workers, cross-border use of business 
services and of equipment and material 
3. The promotion of services 
Authorisation/registration/declaration procedures, ban on advertising, restrictions on content of 
advertising, form of advertising, ban on publishing comparative goods/services testing  
4. Distribution of services 
Monopolies or quantitative restrictions on access to activities, nationality/local-establishment 
requirements, authorisation/registration/declaration procedures, requirements regarding the internal 
firm structure and legal form of the company, professional qualifications, restrictions on the 
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5. Sale of services 
Forms and content of contracts, price setting (plus payments, invoicing and accounting) can be 
distinct as to method and levels (e.g. with professional associations), taxation (e.g. exceptions to 
VAT create complexities/delays in return), reimbursement/subsidy issues, public contracts and 
concessions 
6. Difficulties relating to after-sales services 
Liability and professional indemnity insurance of providers (great and costly disparities between EU 
countries), debt collection, provision of after-sales services, legal redress  
Source:  European Commission, COM (2002) 441 of 30 July 2002, The state of the internal market for 
services, pp. 58-59. 
 
Placing oneself in the position of a business executive, would such a steeple-chase over 
numerous barriers, often with significant discretion on the part of the national authorities and 
hence considerable legal and operational uncertainty, not to speak of the cumulative costs, be 
worth it? And even if certain larger providers of business services (e.g. multinational 
companies in accountancy, or law firms, or in road transport, etc.) might feel compelled to 
‘follow’ multinational clients in manufacturing and somehow absorb such costs, there can be 
little doubt that the number and combined effect of barriers in Box 1 may be nearly-
prohibitive for almost all SMEs.  
3.3  Two examples of sectoral services barriers 
We reproduce, with a few changes, two sectoral illustrations of barriers to the provision of 
services from the literature. The purpose of this subsection is to clarify for readers, not least 
for economists who might wish to estimate the economic impact of barriers or of their 
removal, how incredibly complex the regulatory context of many services is, and hence, how 
difficult it will be to fully appreciate “the” removal of service barriers wholly or in part. The 
point is not to discourage such attempts, but rather to provide a reality check and to offer a 
basis for comprehending the caveats and drawbacks of estimates.  
Box 2 lists 10 restrictive regulatory barriers in banking for establishment in non-EU 
countries. 
17 Apparently, the table assumes that many other regulatory aspects of banking – 
not mentioned here – are imposed on a non-discriminatory basis and in such a way that they 
do not constitute a form of ‘raising rivals’ costs’ (inspecting such subtle barriers requires a 
very detailed and careful analysis of domestic regulation and local supervision).  
Box 2 shows that ‘commercial presence’ (establishment) under GATS can be, and often 
is, restricted in numerous ways and various degrees of stringency. In principle, it is possible to 
‘guesstimate’ degrees of restrictiveness (in scores from 0 to 1, ‘one’ being the most 
restrictive) of each element of the overall restrictions list, and arrive at an overall 
restrictiveness index, which, in some sense, could be regarded as a (very rough) proxy for the 
barriers that are so hard to measure. If done systematically and without bias, one can compare 
such indices between countries, as well as shed some light on changes over time of the 
                                                 
17 The authors (Deardorff & Stern, 2008) employ Box 2 for scoring the components of a foreign services 
restrictiveness index and their weight in the index. Here, we ignore these scores and merely list the 10 barriers. 
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regulatory regimes (here, of banking).
18 In the absence of superior alternatives, these indices 
give at least some idea of what might be seen as ‘barriers’. Nevertheless, one has to be 
extremely careful in accepting these ‘verdicts’ too easily since there is no authoritative way of 
disaggregating the details of such domestic regulation, let alone, of determining how weights 
should be determined. The upshot is that different authors use different methods and come up 
with vastly different results. That the degree of disaggregation matters will be shown in the 
second illustration on air transport services.  
 
Box 2. Barriers, as restrictive regulation, to FDI in banking 
Restrictions on commercial presence 
•  Licensing (authorisation) of foreign banks (e.g. quotas, area restrictions, etc.) 
•  Merger or take-over restrictions (e.g. prohibition, or limits of equity share participation) 
•  Joint venture obligations (e.g. obligation to enter only via JVs, or for a certain period) 
•  Movement of people (e.g. can senior managers, executives, specialists become permanent 
residents, or, if not, can they stay for years, and if so, for how many years?) 
Other restrictions 
•  Raising funds by banks; can they accept deposits and, if yes, unrestrictedly so? can they raise 
funds from the (domestic) capital market? 
•  Lending funds by banks; restrictions in the types/sizes of loans; impositions to provide 
mortgages and/or loans to SMEs, etc.  
•  Refusal of ‘universal bank model’, which is common in the EU; i.e. no insurance and/or 
securities services can be provided, or, in restricted forms 
•  (Expanding) the number of banking outlets; restrictions given or changing over time 
•  Ownership and control restrictions, e.g. how many foreigners in the board and e.g. majority (?) 
•  Temporary movement of people (GATS, mode 4); how many days can how many executives, 
specialists, managers stay for short-term visits?  
Sources: Deardorff & Stern (2008), based on McGuire & Schuele (2000). 
 
Box 3 is similar to Box 2, but now for air transport. International air transport is 
traditionally regulated via bilateral agreements, based on the 1944 Chicago convention and 
inspired (at first) by the mercantilist Bermuda-I agreement and later by the more liberal 
Bermuda-II agreement. Such bilaterals have remained outside GATS (WTO). The basics of 
such bilaterals hinge on the right, restricted or not, of providing air transport services between 
country A and B, i.e. landing rights are granted. Landing rights and the bilateral air services 
agreed to can, in the best case, benefit from no less than seven ‘freedoms’ with increasing 
liberalisation as well as ‘cabotage’ (transport rights inside a country B by an airline from A 
when going to A or coming from A). Air transport regulatory regimes not allowing more than 
the first through the fourth freedoms are rather restrictive, quite apart from many other 
restrictions (see below). Since the mid-1990s, more and more countries have relaxed these 
restrictive regimes, under distinct strategies of liberalisation (such as the so-called ‘Open Sky’ 
                                                 
18 For an application to the elements of banking as described in Box 2, see Dee (2005, pp. 29-30). More 
generally, restrictiveness indices will be dealt with in section 6. ACCESS BARRIERS TO SERVICES MARKETS | 15 
agreements, etc.). Thus, depending on the country, bilaterals might (still) be very restrictive, 
somewhat restrictive or relatively liberal. The old bilaterals would designate specific airlines 
(often, only one from each country) for which the bilateral would apply, implying monopoly 
on bilateral city-pair routes and assured zero entry on both sides. Moreover, detailed capacity 
(sometimes, down to the number of seats in the airplanes) and price regulation, as well as 
(more or less) rigid rules to agree on price levels and changes (subject e.g. to both authorities’ 
approval, which is highly protectionist), tended to be included. All these aspects are specified 
in a simplified way in Box 3. In Box 3 the thorny question of the allowed ‘freedoms’ is only 
incorporated in a more general way, so as not to overburden the presentation, but more about 
this will be noted in section 3.4. 
 
Box 3. Barriers to bilateral trade in airline services 
Designation requirements 
•  Single designation 
•  Multiple designation, with route limitations 
•  Multiple designation  
•  No requirements 
Capacity regulation 
•  Pre-determination 
•  hybrid 
•  Bermuda 1  
•  Free determination 
Price regulation 
•  Double approval 
•  Country-of-origin approval 
•  Double disapproval 
•  No requirements 
Non-scheduled services 
•  No formal traffic rights for charter services 
•  Explicit traffic rights for charter services 
Source: Dee (2005, p. 26). 
 
Although the EU Single Services Market will be dealt with later, it is good to realize 
already here the enormous contrast between Box 3 and intra-EU (EEA) air transport: free 
movement and the right of establishment in air transport inside the EU have gradually been 
realised in the period 1987-92, rendering bilaterals inside the EU superfluous (and illegal), 
whilst subjecting airlines fully to EU competition law as well as to EU regulation on safety, 
occupational health & safety rules for pilots and staff and licensing conditions. De facto, and 
to an extent even de jure, this has been extended to all European countries and even Russia. 
The upshot is that almost nothing of what is listed as restrictive in Box 3 can restrict intra-EU 
air transport today! 16 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
3.4  Exemplifying regulatory finesse of services barriers: Airlines in ASEAN 
Following Dee (2009), we shall outline the restrictiveness of the air transport services regime 
in the member countries of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), as an example 
of disaggregating the categories of barriers listed in the previous boxes. In this way, the reader 
can begin to appreciate better what it means to absorb or overcome such barriers. 
Understanding services barriers in (here) air transport requires an incredible amount of 
detailed knowledge about many restrictions, as well as the combination of specific elements 
of such restrictions. Annex 1 reproduces the full table from Dee (2009, pp. 42-44) and the text 
below will inevitably simplify somewhat. As a corollary, the reader might also begin to 
appreciate the merits and potential benefits of the EU Single Air Transport Market, where 
most of such barriers or restrictions are out of the question.  
Philippa Dee has constructed a scorecard (for ASEAN) based on itemised possible air 
transport services restrictions. It comprises no less than 92 restrictions. However, for a proper 
understanding, the scorecard is solely used here to render more intelligible the nature and 
complexity of air transport services restrictions – of course, this CEPS Special Report is not 
interested in ASEAN itself. The 92 restrictions do not, however, even include the most 
important ‘barriers’ in air services agreements, that is, landing rights and the specification of 
the ‘air services freedoms’ that apply. The reason is that the ASEAN Multilateral Agreement 
on Air Services is assumed to apply, an agreement in the framework of arriving at the 
ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. In this regional agreement, there is a so-called 
‘Open Sky’ commitment about third, fourth and fifth freedoms in air services which – given 
the mercantilist tradition in air services bilaterals – goes quite far in the liberal direction.
19 
Yet, that is exactly why this example is so instructive about the manifold and often subtle (but 
no less obstructive) restrictions in services, here, air transport. Thus, despite all 10 ASEAN 
countries being committed to ‘Open Sky’ obligations amongst themselves, which might lead 
one to believe that a liberal service regime is installed, no less than 92 other relevant 
restrictions may well apply in one, several or all ASEAN countries! For a good 
understanding, these restrictions (except item B., see below) may apply to scheduled 
passenger air transport, cargo or cargo only for express parcels, and charters. Although two of 
the 92 items are elements of (what in the EU is seen as) competition policy – namely, state aid 
to airlines and – with some overlap – loss coverage by the government – central tenets of 
competition policy such as cartels, mergers and monopolistic conduct, which are likely to 
constitute a serious hindrance to entry for foreign providers, are not even included in the list 
of 92.  
The main categories of possible restrictions in the scorecard include ‘commercial 
presence’ (GATS mode 3) – mainly restrictions on ‘entry’, divided into restrictions for any 
                                                 
19 Trade in air services begins with the third freedom (the first is a fly-over right; the second is landing only for 
re-fuelling and maintenance). The third and fourth freedoms consist of air services between countries A and B; 
the third one between A and B for a company from A, the fourth one between A to B for a company from B. If 
there is no designation of airlines, this freedom is unrestricted: any licensed airline from A or B can fly between 
A and B. With designation, however, the freedoms only apply to those airlines explicitly designated. The fifth 
freedom is the right to fly from A to B by an airline from C as long as the flight ends in or originates from 
country C. The sixth freedom idem, but now the company from C may only need to stop in C. The seventh 
freedom drops even that restriction: an airline from C can provide air services between A and B (basically what 
the EU would call ‘free movement’ as long as C is an EU country). Besides, there is cabotage (as in all transport 
modes): flying between two or more airports inside country A by a company from (say) B. Cabotage is allowed 
but restricted if the airline has to offer cabotage as a part of a service continuing to its own country; if 
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firm versus those applying only to foreign firms, hence, discriminatory – restrictions on cross-
border trade (mode 1 of GATS, though airlines do not fall under GATS today), restrictions on 
the movement of intra- airlines corporate transferees (staff) of foreign airlines in the relevant 
(ASEAN) country, restrictions of private ownership – is private ownership allowed, whether 
for existing companies or for new entrants? – as well as a list about restrictions of foreign 
ownership – existing versus new entrants – complemented by questions like ‘golden shares’ 
for the government giving it special voting rights and the ownership of airlines in 
international airports (which can lead to anti-competitive conduct or structures) and, last but 
not least, restrictions in air transport regulation (such as on the setting of air fares, the 
allocation of slots on (busy or congested) airports as well as a host of differentiated licensing 
conditions. Constructing a restrictiveness index from so many variables is not just complex 
but clearly hazardous. This does not necessarily imply that such empirical exercises are 
meaningless, e.g. even when all restrictive items found are given an equal weight of one, 
some very rough conclusions are nonetheless possible. All ASEAN countries have quite a few 
restrictions except Singapore (only 6), varying from 19 (Thailand) to 51 (Malaysia), Laos (55) 
and even 66 (Vietnam), with an ASEAN average of no less than 37. Moreover, Dee 
complains about the secrecy of a number of arrangements which simply are not published or 
supplied upon request for academic purposes! Such secrecy is either a source of 
discriminatory treatment (which is very hard to discover) or a barrier in itself. In Annex 1, this 
secrecy shows up in the listing under mode 1 (item B.), cross-border intra-ASEAN flights, of 
restrictions only for various charter services, and not for scheduled passenger services which 
are of course far more important – the restrictions for the latter have not been systematically 
provided to Dr. Dee. Furthermore, this might mean – but there is no way of knowing – that 
airline designation and capacity restrictions (see Box 3) in cross-border intra-ASEAN 
scheduled passenger flights, which are not explicitly mentioned in the box, have to be added 
in the list of 92 items. In the past, these two restrictions were usually applied rather frequently 
and the complete removal would indeed signal far-reaching liberalisation.  
This disaggregation exercise on the basis of careful research by Dee (2009) 
demonstrates that even a list of 92 items is far from clear or complete on i) the air transport 
freedoms, ii) capacity restrictions (if any), iii) airline designations (if any) and iv) all, rather 
than some, elements of competition policy or its absence. It is therefore less than clear, to put 
it mildly, what one can actually measure when using restrictiveness indices in such a case. 
4.  The EU horizontal services Directive: Nature, meaning and barriers 
removal 
The basics of the 2006 EU horizontal services Directive are simple; the precise details are not, 
as shown, for example, by the Commission Handbook (European Commission, 2007) and the 
very detailed report on the mutual evaluation exercise on the implementation of the services 
Directive between the EU member states (European Commission, 2011a, 2011b). For present 
purposes, the basics will do, complemented with some telling examples about removed 
barriers to intra-EU services exchange. 
4.1  Nature and economic meaning of the services Directive 
The services Directive is a ‘horizontal’ liberalisation directive, that is, it applies across-the-
board to a range of sectors in a similar way. It does not aim to harmonise national objectives 
and instruments of specific services regulation, let alone, replace national by EU regulatory 
regimes. By and large, it codifies the CJEU case law on free movement and the right of 18 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
establishment, complemented by some helpful features (such as detailed administrative 
cooperation between member states; lowering information and transaction costs for business 
by administrative simplification and trade facilitation e.g. the national Points of Single 
Contact; and provisions on the quality of services) which should reduce significantly the 
perceived costs of doing (services) business in the internal market. The codification in this 
directive greatly simplifies the enforcement of the economic freedoms, in particular by an 
explicit catalogue of forbidden regulatory restrictions imposed by (some) member states.  
When trying to grasp the economic meaning of the services Directive, one might be 
forgiven for being misled by its relatively modest ambition in re-asserting free movement (in 
Art. 16, the proposed country-of-origin principle was removed by the EP) and the right of 
establishment (chapter III, restating case law, but in a more practical fashion). The economist 
might ask what the value-added is of restating what treaty and case law already provide for. 
An economic impact analysis might attempt to capture the lower information and transaction 
costs and the gains of easier market access due to faster and more effective administrative 
cooperation between the relevant officials of the member states. But that would be it, more or 
less.  
This expectation is wrong-footed for several interesting reasons. First, the shift from 
mere CJEU case law to a directive (e.g. with lists of explicit prohibitions) and the uniquely 
rigorous implementation (see Box 4) have moved the potential economic impact far beyond a 
trivial one, both for trade (free movement) and FDI (establishment). Second, removing 
services ‘barriers’ in the EU internal market takes place by either abolishing or reducing (the 
restrictiveness of) national regulation, non-discriminatorily. This simply means that a rigorous 
implementation of the services Directive amounts to a domestic pro-competitive regulatory 
reform. Therefore, the economist has to realise that the opening up to (more) services imports 
is neither the only effect, nor is it the predominant economic effect. The latter will consist of 
the economic impact of domestic reform of services markets (implied by barrier removal), 
bound to be larger overall, since domestic volumes of services output are much larger than 
intra-EU services trade. Initially, the domestic reform element was not incorporated in 
empirical economic research on intra-EU services liberalisation, as briefly surveyed in 
Mustilli & Pelkmans (2012). However, the work by Monteagudo, Rutkowski & Lorenzani 
(2012) clearly supports the two points made here. Having access to country data of the 2010 
mutual evaluation (see Box 4), they first show for 14 main service activities: 
•  the average percentage of barriers to intra-EU services trade removed/reduced per EU 
country, ranging from 1% to 61%, and from 6% to 58% for barriers to FDI and their 
local activity; 
•  the number of restrictions abolished (around 300 in total) or partially reduced (some 
800-plus in total) for each sector and 
•  the share of previously existing restrictions abolished or reduced, in each sector, ranging 
from 83% (travel agencies) to 61% (accountants).  
The conclusion is obvious: the Directive boiled down to a major domestic reform of the 
services falling under it. The results of their empirical estimates are presented in three steps: a 
conservative estimate of a positive impact on EU GDP of 0.8%, another 0.4% when EU 
countries would all find themselves at the EU average level of barriers and, finally, not 0.4% 
but 1.6% on top of 0.8% in case member states are assumed to find themselves at the level of 
restrictions of the five least-restrictive ones in the Union. In accordance with the above, they 
note that the “…domestic transmission channel, i.e. the direct impact of barriers reduction on 
labour productivity, turns out to be very significant and…the main driver of the estimated 
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Box 4. How implementation of the services Directive greatly improved market access 
EU member states have a duty, under the treaty, to properly implement any directive and it is no 
different for the services Directive 2006/123. However, this Directive was regarded as so complex 
and important that it comprises a uniquely detailed programme of obligations with respect to 
national implementation, often in close cooperation with the Commission and with other member 
states. Thus, besides a detailed Handbook for implementation (European Commission, 2007) – 
already unusual – and a multi-annual cooperation effort in several joint implementation committees 
(member states and the Commission) – again, this is not the regular practice as member states are 
usually on their own – all member states had the explicit duty to ‘screen’ their domestic national and 
regional legislation on its compatibility with the Directive (in effect, with EU law and case law, 
something that had almost certainly never been done before by any member state given the massive 
body of services law in every EU country at various levels). This domestic screening was bound to 
uncover many illegitimate restrictions that had so far gone unnoticed and indeed, it did, thousands 
of them; all of these have been removed. On top of all this, Art. 39 of the Directive imposes a 
‘mutual evaluation’ between member states of the implementation and screening in 2010, again a 
uniquely cooperative exercise. The mutual evaluation report (European Commission, 2011b) reveals 
in great detail how much has been achieved by this joint exercise between the member states. The 
upshot is that the removal of barriers, including hidden discrimination, has been far more rigorous 
and extensive than anybody could reasonably have expected. Intra-EU market access has improved 
greatly and EU enforcement will be less problematic than feared.  
 
4.2  Removing or disciplining national restrictions in services markets 
We shall now elaborate on the specifics of the removal or disciplining of domestic regulation 
(causing ‘barriers’) under the services Directive. We present two tables with critical 
liberalisation measures provided for in the services Directive: Table 5 on the right of 
establishment in other EU countries and Table 6 on the free movement of services in the 
internal market. Table 5 summarises three catalogues of restrictions on the right of 
establishment of services providers, now explicitly forbidden or disciplined. Both for 
authorities, local, regional and national, of member states and for companies, in particular 
SMEs, the relevant articles in the Directive (and the explanation in the Commission 
Handbook) are far more simple, user-friendly, practical and transparent than the splintered 
and complicated case-law in services drafted over many hundreds of cases heard over more 
than two decades. These prohibitions and evaluations (disciplines) reflect a long experience of 
the Commission with illegal or problematic practices in the internal market,
20 and the progress 
in effective liberalisation as captured in the provisions in the Directive is significant. 
                                                 
20 How much the EU has progressed in this respect is clear when comparing Table 5 with Tables 4.1-4.3 (pp. 53-
54) in the consultancy report by the Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services (2001), “Barriers to trade in 
business services”, which underpinned the well-known Commission paper (2002), listing and discussing the 
services barriers in the internal market and used for Box 1 of this CEPS Special Report. Of the nine barriers to 
trading services cross-border in the EU in their Table 4.1, eight are clearly forbidden and one is at least better 
addressed today (diploma recognition of professionals); of the 10 barriers on establishment, six are forbidden 
and three of the other four would have to be evaluated against EU principles; of the 16 barriers that are not 
necessarily ‘regulatory’ but perhaps cultural (etc.), seven would be impossible under proper (EU) enforcement 
under the services Directive or wider (e.g. subsidies) and one (national standards) has gradually become 
irrelevant, since European standardisation is taking over. The remaining barriers in this group are either 
unavoidable (e.g. local language) or under local regulatory autonomy of member states (e.g. land zoning) or 
could possibly be assessed under ‘proportionality’ and ‘better regulation’.  20 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
Table 5. Barriers to establishment outlawed or disciplined by the EU services Directive 
Provision Prohibitions 
Art. 14 on 
prohibited 
requirements 
1.  Discriminatory requirements based on nationality or location of head office 
(such as nationality requirements for provider, staff, persons holding share 
capital, or residency obligations) 
2.  Requirement of having an establishment in more than one EU country, or, 
enrolled in professional bodies or associations in more than one EU country 
3.  Restrictions on the freedom of a provider to choose between a principal or a 
secondary establishment, or on the freedom to choose between an agency, 
branch or a subsidiary 
4.  Reciprocity conditions, e.g. with another member state 
5.  ‘Economic needs’ test, at least not case-by-case (except for land planning or 
other overriding reasons of the public interest – strictly narrow, CJEU) 
6.  Direct or indirect involvement of competitors in the granting of 
authorisations or related decisions 
7.  Obligations to take out insurance of financial guarantees from a local 
provider or body, rather than a general obligation of insurance 
8.  Obligations to have been pre-registered or to have previously exercised the 




1.  In Art. 15.3 the following restrictions have to be evaluated with respect to 
three conditions, fundamental principles of EU (internal market) law: 
(a)  Non-discrimination (far-reaching in the EU), 
(b) Necessity, the ‘overriding public interest’ test and 
(c)  Proportionality, hence, (i) suitable to attain the objective, (ii) does not go 
beyond what is necessary to attain the objective and (iii) least restrictive 
2.  Quantitative or territorial restrictions (e.g. minimum geographical distance 
between providers; limits according to population) 
3.  Specific legal form 
4.  Requirements about the shareholding of the firm 
5.  Reservation of activities to certain providers, except where explicitly 
allowed by EU law, e.g. professionals 
6.  A ban of having more than one establishment in a country 
7.  Fixing a minimum no. of employees 
8.  Fixed minimum or maximum tariffs 
9.  Obligations to supply other services jointly with his service 






1.  Authorisations are always subject to the same three principles as above, 
under Art. 15, item 1. 
2.  Other criteria to be applied in the evaluation include clarity and 
unambiguity, objectivity, advance publication of criteria, transparency and 
accessibility. 
3.  No duplication of requirements or controls that are equivalent to those 
already made in any other EU country (kind of mutual recognition). 
4.  Appropriate speed (as soon as) and such periods must be clear in advance; 
being late as an authority, means: authorisation is granted. 
5.  Refusal to be fully reasoned and open to challenge in local courts. 
6.  No limited periods (except justified – strict test). 
7.  If resources or technical systems (e.g. frequencies for mobile telecoms) 
impose scarcity, the selection of candidates must take place with 
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Table 6 summarises forbidden restrictions as well as disciplines of national regulation 
of the intra-EU cross-border free movement of services (‘trade’). Art. 16.1 reiterates the free 
movement obligation of the treaty and specifies that member states shall not make access to 
or exercise of a service activity in their territory subject to regulation that does not respect 
non-discrimination, necessity and proportionality. Art. 17 collects a large number of sectors 
and services activities that do not fall under the Directive (so-called derogations). Most of 
these fall under specific EU regulation (see section 5). However, whatever misgivings one 
might have of this long list of derogations, there are nevertheless a lot of services which do 
fall under the directive (see section 4.3).  
Table 6. Barriers to services trade outlawed or disciplined by the EU services Directive 
Art. 16.2 on 
prohibited 
requirements 
1.  No establishment obligation in EU country of destination 
2.  No required authorisation, including entry in a register, or 
registration with a professional body, except where provided in this 
directive or in other EU law provisions 
3.  No banning of certain business infrastructure needed to supply 
services from another EU country 
4.  No services contract between provider and recipient which prevents 
or restricts services supply by the self-employed 
5.  No requirement for IDs, specific to the exercise of a service activity 
6.  No requirements which affect the use of equipment/materials needed 
for services supply, unless regulated for health and safety reasons 
(but usually this is under EU directives; asking more is very hard to 
justify as proportionate). 
Art. 16.3 on national 




Allowed are regulatory requirements justified by a) public policy and 
public security [strict CJEU case law disciplines]; b) public health [often 
under EU regulation already]; c) environmental protection [again, often 
under EU law, except when truly local]; d) rules on employment 
conditions including those in collective agreements [not caught by EU 
law, as a rule, since this is under national powers]  
[Note that by the end of 2012, the Commission can propose 
harmonisation directives, if Art. 16.3 gives sufficient reasons.] 
Art. 18 on safety 
regulation (strict 
discipline) 
In exceptional circumstances only, and solely if issue is not under EU 
regulation, if protection higher in receiving country, for the recipient, 
than in country of origin and if ‘mutual assistance’ between member 
states (Art. 35) is not sufficient. 
Arts 19-20 on 
restrictions affecting 
the recipients of 
services 
No restrictions on service supply from another member state, i.e. no 
authorisation or even a declaration to authorities, and no discriminatory 
provisions relating to nationality of the provider or the place of residence 
 
Table 6 clarifies that, despite the removal of the origin principle, intra-EU cross-border 
trade in services has become protected by a range of explicit prohibitions (some overlapping 
with those related to establishment) and several tight disciplines. Also the recipient of services 
is explicitly protected against restrictions. Furthermore, the administrative cooperation 
between member states is crucial: only if this ‘mutual assistance’ does not yield satisfactory 
results, can certain safety rules be imposed, but even then under disciplines. All of the specific 
prohibitions and disciplines are elaborated in great detail in the Commission Handbook. It 
would go beyond the purpose of the present paper to discuss these questions at such a level of 
detail. But readers are warned that some of the interpretations or the remaining regulatory 22 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
autonomy of member states or sub-central governments may well lead to additional costs of 
market access which, in business circles, might still be perceived as barriers. In this respect, 
the EU’s internal market is hardly different from those of federal OECD countries such as the 
US, Canada, Switzerland or Australia. All of these internal markets have such ‘barriers’ in 
services in different degrees (for a careful comparison, see Anderson, 2013). 
Any system of two-level government will, by its very nature, allow and indeed respect 
some degree of regulatory autonomy of the states or provinces or cantons, in particular where 
local preferences lead to an insistence of regulation that has no counterpart at the central level. 
In ‘deep’ internal services markets, the scope of such autonomy has shrunk drastically but 
fully-fledged centralisation or total uniformity is neither desirable from a welfare-economic 
point of view nor is it found anywhere in federal countries. Therefore, it cannot be surprising 
that the EU, which is not even a ‘country’ and only has a quasi-federal set-up of its internal 
market, would have no perceived ‘barriers’ left. On the other hand, the services Directive and 
its uniquely meticulous implementation have erased numerous barriers which, justified or not 
(often not!), frustrated and fragmented the internal services market only a decade ago.  
One final point should be made on the second row of Table 6, Art. 16.3 on national 
regulatory autonomy. Prior to the services Directive, CJEU case law on such regulatory 
autonomy had been built up in the absence of suitable EU legislation by the Council and 
European Parliament. Fearing that the EU Court would be forced into a position of a quasi-
legislator, which of course it did not want, the CJEU judicial strategy was to allow a wide 
scope of derogations of free services movement (in principle) justifiable for member states, 
combined with strict disciplines in terms of non-discrimination, proportionality, necessity and 
options for mutual recognition.
21 Much of this case law is recognisable in the Directive, as 
shown in Tables 5 and 6. However, Art. 16.3 on national regulatory autonomy is narrower 
than the prior case law: besides obvious grounds such as public policy and public security – 
the CJEU has a forceful tradition of defining such derogations very narrowly, in order to 
prevent misuse – public health and environment (the H and the E of SHEIC) have remained 
from earlier case law and a clause on employment conditions and collective agreements 
between social partners is a consequence of the national powers in this domain. Safety – the S 
of SHEIC – is not in, although a very narrow window is left open in Art. 18 (third row of 
Table 6) and several other derogations from case law have not been included. Some observers 
fear that this might, sooner or later, lead to a fundamental case challenging the Directive’s 
legal validity, because the (EU) legislator cannot overrule CJEU case law, seen as an 
extension of the treaty. 
Given the prudency of the CJEU prior to the Directive, leading to a definition of a very 
wide scope, it is not clear whether such derogations ‘in principle’ will retain any practical 
meaning now that the EU legislator has finally enacted. There is the famous derogation on tax 
breaks for the interest paid on mortgages loans, which the CJEU said could be merely 
‘national’ (hence, not for cross-border mortgages!) so as to not undermine the ‘coherence of 
the national tax system’.
22 However, this problem is pre-empted by Art. 2.3, excluding 
taxation. There are the I (investor and savers protection) and the C (consumer protection) of 
SHEIC, which are not mentioned in Art. 16.3. Clearly, investors and savers are protected 
under financial market regulation and supervision, which falls outside the scope of the 
                                                 
21 A convenient summary of these derogations, called “overriding reasons relating to the public interest” and 
often referred to as the doctrine of the “general good” in relation to free movement of services and the right of 
establishment of service providers, is found in the Preamble of the services Directive, item 40.  
22 The famous Bachman case: Case C-204/90 Bachmann [1992] ECR I-249. ACCESS BARRIERS TO SERVICES MARKETS | 23 
Directive. With respect to consumer protection, the Directive stipulates a number of quality 
provisions on integrity and information, besides inter-member states’ cooperation on e.g. the 
good reputation of services providers where requested. There are also provisions for smooth 
dispute settlement, including the incorporation of such facilitation in codes-of-conduct of 
national professional associations. For the remainder, EU consumer protection remains linked 
to specific activities (e.g. misleading advertising or door-to-door selling) or specific markets 
(e.g. financial markets, food safety, non-food safety and alert mechanisms) and is not affected 
by this Directive.  
4.3  What markets and economic activities fall under the services Directive?  
Although the scope of this horizontal Directive is wide, it has nevertheless been curtailed for 
two reasons. First, there is the distinction between (more) heavily regulated services sectors, 
falling outside 2006/123 as they have their ‘own’ regulation (and market institutions as well) 
and lightly regulated sectors which, for the most part, fall under the services Directive. 
Section 5 deals with the former. Second, in the turmoil of preparing the enactment of the 
Directive (known at the time as the Bolkestein draft), the country-of-origin principle was the 
core of the proposed Art. 16.1. This more radical principle not only led to a huge 
politicisation of the debate, but also to more quiet tactics of sectoral lobbyists trying to simply 
get their sectors excluded via a derogation. These tactics worked for several activities, 
enlarging the number of derogations. Table 7 juxtaposes the sectors or activities covered by 
2006/123 and those specifically derogated in the text.  
On the right-hand side, one sees immediately that the services not covered by the 
services Directive either have a separate status in the treaty, with their ‘own’ regulatory 
regimes (i.e. financial services, transport, network industries) or have been covered on the 
basis of a separate directive (e.g. patients’ rights seeking healthcare, temporary work 
agencies) or are expected to be covered (e.g. private securities, where common regulation 
proves to be difficult, and perhaps in future, gambling activities). Barriers remain in areas that 
are simply derogated, without any further follow-up regulation (e.g. notaries, taxation, 
gambling). Of course, case law and general EU principles will still apply but may not pre-
empt all restrictions.  
The European Commission states that the sectors falling under the services Directive 
generate nearly 43% of the EU’s GNP. This figure seems telling about the enormous 
importance of the services Directive, but it is good to make two annotations: 
a)  A good deal of this nearly 43% amount to domestic service activity and most of this 
domestic value generation is not potentially cross-border in any way – it is hard to say 
exactly how much. 
b)  The activities in the left column of Table 7 cannot always be matched with Eurostat 
statistics so that even the cross-border totals of today (cross-border trade and local 
output of ‘foreign’ establishments of EU companies) can only be ‘guesstimated’ 
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Table 7. What sectors and economic activities are covered by the services Directive? 
Included Not  included/Covered 
1.  Regulated professions (such as legal and fiscal 
advisers, architects, engineers, accountants, 
surveyors) [but diploma recognition matters 
here, see Directive 2005/36] 
1.  Non-economic services of general interest (by 
definition, a ‘service’ in the treaty is 
‘economic’, so these SGIs cannot fall under 
the directive); most (subsidised) education, 
some public health services, social services 
2.  Craftsmen 2.  Financial services, i.e. banking, insurance, 
investment services and asset management 
3.  Business-related services (such as office 
maintenance, management consultancy, 
events, recovery of debts, advertising, 
recruitment services) 
3.  Electronic communications and networks, now 
governed by the third telecoms package of 
2009 (which includes the transport of 
broadcasting, not the contents)  
4.  Distributive trades (including wholesale and 
retail of goods and services) 
4.  Transport, all six modes (road, buses, river, 
maritime, air and rail), and taxis + ambulances 
derogated at the last moment 
5.  Tourism services (including travel agencies)  5.  Services of temporary work agencies, now 
under Directive 2008/104 
6.  Leisure services (including sports centres & 
amusement parks) 
6.  Healthcare [sticking points here are mobile 
patients moving across intra-EU borders to 
receive healthcare services – link with private 
and social insurance/re-imbursement systems 
– public healthcare systems are under national 
powers and ‘harmonisation’ is prohibited in 
the Treaty – yet, Directive 2011/24 on 
patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare was 
adopted]. Note that medical and para-medical 
professions as well as veterinarians and 
pharmacists do not fall under item 1, left, and 
enjoy automatic recognition under a separate 
legal regime (see section 5.4). 
7.  Construction services  7.  Audio-visual services (broadcasting) 
8.  Installation and equipment maintenance  8.  Gambling 
9.  Information services (including web portals, 
news agencies, publishing, computer 
programming) 
9.  Activities related to exercise of (public) 
authority 
10. Accommodation and food services (incl. 
hotels, restaurants, cafés/pubs, catering) 
10. Private securities services [in this case, a 
separate directive is awaited; in the meantime, 
barriers remain] 
11. Training and education (but not education 
entirely or mainly funded by government) 
(including dedicated courses, business schools, 
upskilling and refreshing training, commercial 
language training) 
11. Services provided by notaries and bailiffs 
[often related to an official act of government] 
12. Rental (e.g. cars) and leasing services  12. The field of taxation 
13. Real estate services   
14. Testing and certification services   
15. Household support services (including 
cleaning, private nannies, gardening) 
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4.4  Lingering barriers after five years of the services Directive 
The mutual evaluation (European Commission, 2011a and 2011b) makes it possible to assess 
the implementation of the Directive, including the widespread removal or disciplining of 
restrictions, as well as the remaining barriers. The report and very extensive annex allows us 
to draw up a fairly detailed qualitative panorama of abolitions and simplifications of 
restrictive measures, due to the screening and mutual evaluation between the member states, 
as well as a qualitative picture of remaining barriers to services exchange in the EU internal 
market. The exercise is complementary to the more aggregate presentation in Monteagudo et 
al. (2012) and identifies barriers in considerable detail. This is done in Tables 8, 9 and Annex 
2 (a detailed sectoral perspective).  
Tables 8 (on establishment-related restrictions) and 9 (on cross-border restrictions) 
leave no doubt about the considerable abolition and simplification of restrictions to intra-EU 
services exchange due to the services Directive, following the screening exercise and the 
mutual evaluation. Following the Commission’s report on the latter, it is also clear that the 
mutual evaluation amongst the EU member states has given rise to numerous discussions 
about the regulatory rationale of lingering restrictions, in effect, the justification and scope or 
boundaries of market failures as well as the assessment of the proportionality of the tools of 
government intervention. In other words, the evaluation has had a ‘better regulation’ effect as 
well. However, it is equally clear that a select number of remaining barriers either seem to 
have a questionable justification in terms of market failures or appear to be more restrictive 
than necessary. Today’s much greater transparency of services barriers in the EU will 
therefore help to pursue still deeper liberalisation or simplification in the years to come, 
thereby accomplishing greater exposure to actual or potential competition in the Single 
Market and/or lower transaction costs when barriers are, in principle, justified but the means 
too heavy.  
Table 8 shows that, depending on the type of services falling under the services 
Directive, exploiting the right-of-establishment can be quite a burdensome venture. Going by 
the crude impact indicators, the restrictive impact of barriers to establishment in these 
‘regulated’ sectors cannot be taken lightly. At the same time, one should always keep in mind 
that some sectors under the services Directive are hardly or not affected by the barriers listed 
in Table 8 (e.g. office management, management consultancy, information services – see 
Table 7 – and household support services; probably industrial cleaning as well, subject to EU 
SHE regulation). Moreover, tourism appears to be subjected to more restrictions than one 
might perhaps expect, but these restrictions apply merely to a narrow subset of tourist services 
(e.g. special guiding tours and mountain or cave trips) as well as some regulation of travel 
agencies, which hardly affect most economic activity in European tourism. In other words, it 
is crucial for an economic assessment to have careful regard to the (sub)sectors affected and 
not affected by the restrictions listed in Table 8. 
We shall come back to the sectoral perspective, shortly. In the impact column of Table 
8, for the nine categories of restrictions to establishment, there are only two As (light), as 
against 5 Bs (more than a nuisance), 8 Cs (restrictive, anti-competitive) and 5 Ds (severe 
hindrance, which can sometimes mean ‘impossible’), mitigated by selective abolition and 
simplification for all nine categories. The services Directive may have cleaned up a lot of 
restrictions of establishment but this is not to be interpreted as ‘unrestricted’ market access, 
dependent on the activity. Another striking feature of Table 8 is the incredible diversity, or, if 
one wishes, regulatory ‘heterogeneity’, in the exact instruments employed as well as in what 
cases they are (not) employed. The more one zooms in, the greater this heterogeneity appears 
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restrictions [in categories 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 9], a colourful variation of details can be observed. 
The most obvious instance is item 7, where service tariffs are regulated by law or decree or 
via recognised self-regulation: there are fixed, maximum and minimum tariffs and they differ 
by member state and, often, by activity. In various ways, this heterogeneity applies for all 
categories. This is even true for one category [no. 9, restrictions on multi-disciplinary 
activities] where the services Directive explicitly restricts its application to technical 
certification and to the professions only. The heterogeneity is reflected in a different fashion 
in categories 5, 6 and 8 where some member states employ the instruments and (many) others 
do not, raising questions about the justification of such restrictions, or, alternative (least-
restrictive?) ways used by those other member states.  
From an economic and business point of view, the expected economic gains of the 
services Directive were at first thought to be primarily in the establishment chapter, hardly 
touched by the ferocious debates in the European Parliament, and explicitly doing away with 
truly anti-competitive restrictions such as the ‘economic needs’ test or other severe hindrances 
(see Table 5, Art. 14) to market access. With the help of Table 8, one can conclude that none 
of the eight prohibited requirements in Art. 14 appear in the list of remaining barriers, 
showing the practical success of the Directive. These restrictions were often throttling the 
incentives to invest abroad inside the internal services market (and sometimes rendering it 
impossible), and their removal is bound to have a significant economic impact in the longer 
run. Nevertheless, for a services company to establish in a second (or third) national EU 
market, one needs to adapt to and incorporate the local properties and tacit services business 
culture, which is not always easy. The competitive advantages of the company or its service 
products should be such that it still pays to enter, given the adaptation required to appeal to 
local clients.
23 Beyond that, the remaining barriers come in: those listed in Table 8 may well 
generate considerable costs and delays, or, worse, may negatively affect the business model 
used successfully so far. Therefore, although the services Directive is undoubtedly useful in 
opening up some national services bastions and lowering transaction costs by means of 
simplification, the costs of adaptation to local business and tastes (often, larger than in goods 
markets) as well as the lingering barriers militate against the expectation that the boost to 
intra-EU establishment in other markets is going to be huge. Moreover, for companies 
considering  EU-wide business strategies, Table 8 shows the incredible regulatory 
heterogeneity in a number of services sectors which raises (ceteris paribus) the fixed cost of 
entry for each separate market and might even, in some cases, put at risk the tested or planned 
business model (see also section 6).  
 
                                                 
23 See Francois & Hoekman (2010, pp. 650-651) for a more fundamental discussion of models explaining FDI, 
e.g. the knowledge-capital model and firm selection approaches; also, internalisation of transaction costs and 
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Table 8. Establishment of related intra-EU services barriers: Removals and lingering 
 
Note: The ‘restrictive impact’ column should be read as follows: A = light, B = more than a nuisance, C = restrictive, anti-competitive, D = 
severe hindrance. MS = member state(s). 
Source: European Commission (2011b). 
Frequency   Main forms
a. for companies and/or
for individual
entrepreneurs
b. beyond registration in
company registers
a. limited no. of providers









b. min. capital req.s (for
professionals, often both
a. and b.)
5. Bans on  2
nd 
establishment




a. fixed no. (one ; more
than one)










b. max. tariffs (retail
network services if
dominant ; real estate)
c. min. tariffs (regulated
professions)
8. Compulsory 
bundled supply of 
services
quite common A / C selectively, yes rather few ( social services e.g.
elderly; therapeutic
equipment+training)
note : Services dir. only
allows this for technical
certification (etc.) and
for professions]
a. obligation to exercise
activity exclusively
b. restrictions on joint
activities
9. Restrictions on 
multi-disciplinary 




B / C/ D selectively, yes many




B selectively, yes quite a few




A / C / D selectively, yes quite a few
3. Legal form 
requirements
common C / D selectively, yes many M.S. 
4. Share-holding 
requirements (often 
linked to 3., above)
common (23
M.S.)
C / D selectively, yes many
1.  Authorizations common 
(highly 
diverse)










B / C / D selectively, yes many M.S.
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Table 9 on cross-border restrictions to intra-EU services exchange (‘trade’) is somewhat 
different. Member states can be divided in two groups. The first one (the largest group of 24 
member states) has implemented the cross-border chapter by means of a horizontal clause in 
national law reflecting Art. 16.1 on the freedom to supply services across intra-EU borders. 
Subsequently, all specifications in laws inconsistent with this clause have been removed, 
unless explicit exceptions can be invoked. This approach must imply a widespread abolition 
of restrictions and demonstrates the great value of the domestic screening process. In Table 9, 
the overall effect of this ‘horizontal’ abolition is perhaps a little hidden, but its significance is 
likely to be considerable. However, as the table shows, a closer look clarifies that this larger 
group has three subgroups: one group (six countries) employs the automatic clause, 15 
countries have enacted a semi-automatic clause, allowing greater discretion, whereas three 
countries provide even greater regulatory discretion. One should expect that the prohibited 
requirements from Arts 16.2 and 16.3, as listed in Table 6, would all be caught by the 
horizontal clause, unless explicitly maintained (with proper justification). The second group 
of three member states relies solely on sector-specific amendments to improve market access.  
Given these approaches, Table 9 provides details on four sets of cross-border 
restrictions: the obligation to have an establishment (explicitly forbidden in Art. 16.2, based 
on CJEU case law), authorisation, notification or declaration duties and a few ‘other’ 
requirements. An establishment requirement for cross-border services amounts (in the eyes of 
the CJEU) to a denial of the very nature of this service activity: cross-border services should 
not need a local establishment – such a requirement turns it into another mode of supply. Row 
3 of Table 9 shows that member states have responded to the Directive with complete 
abolition in 16 countries and elsewhere for most instances (which leads one to wonder why 
the crystal-clear CJEU case law was not responded to!). What remains is perhaps 
understandable for tobacco and alcoholic beverages – although it is puzzling why an 
authorisation would not do – but hard to grasp for other cases, even though they are relatively 
few and scattered. 
The second set of restrictions relate to compulsory authorisation plus entry in a register. 
Table 9 observes widespread abolition of this instrument. Yet many instances remain; they are 
specified for 11 sectors, most of them with appreciable turnover (certification, testing, 
inspection; construction and crafts; tourism and leisure; private education; wholesale, retail; 
food and beverages and smaller ones). Table 6 specifies clearly (no. 2 under Art. 16.2) that 
such requirements are forbidden, unless explicitly provided for in EU law. Thus, the lingering 
barriers in the 11 sectors listed in Table 9 should be verified with respect to their justification 
in various EU directives or regulations. Given these restrictions, lowering the costs of doing 
cross-border services business depends critically on the mutual recognition of the diplomas or 
competences based in some way on home country control and equivalence. This is not 
reported but the more widespread mutual recognition, the more the restrictive impact will be 
reflected in the “B” rather than the “C” indicator, hence, the more competitive the services 
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Table 9. Cross-border intra-EU services barriers: Removal and lingering 
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a. Automatic clause 
b. Exceptions clear 
Option 2: (15 MS) 
a. Semi-automatic clause 
b. Some discretion 
Option 3:  
a. Less general clause, with 
discretion 
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other exceptions [MS want 
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Many  a. Certification and 
analysis/inspection services 
b. Construction, crafts 
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substances 
d. Services w.r.t. 
animals/plants and national 
parks 
e. Tourism and leisure 
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(outdoor markets and 
specific retail) 
h. Food and beverages 
i. Services to legal courts 
j. Selected business 
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Very selective only 
Note: The ‘restrictive impact’ column should be read as follows: A = light, B = more than a nuisance, C = 
restrictive, anti-competitive, D = severe hindrance. MS = member state(s). 
Source: European Commission (2011b). 
The third set of restrictions consists of notifications or declarations to the authorities. 
This measure is typically a precaution on the part of authorities who want to be well-informed 
in case there is an accident or other reason to control or inspect. It is a light obligation, except 
when the notification requirements go very far. It occurs frequently (despite selective 
abolition) and often at the local or regional level. Nevertheless, not all member states impose 
such requirements. The fourth set of restrictions is a mixed bag. After selective abolition, 
relatively few member states maintain provisions on bringing along equipment necessary for 
supplying the cross-border temporary service, on required insurance for cross-border activity 
(which can be difficult or costly to obtain) and on a compulsory dedicated ID card for the 
relevant specialisation. Two of these (equipment and ID cards) are in principle forbidden (see 
Table 6, under Art. 16.2) whilst insurance may be difficult to justify under Arts 19 and 20 of 
the Directive (see Table 6, bottom row). The overall conclusion is that the Directive, via the 
screening and mutual evaluation, has accomplished what many years of CJEU case law did 
not: significant abolition of barriers to cross-border services business. It is speculative to pose 
the question whether the origin principle – with its limited derogations based on overriding 
justifications in the public interest as well as its explicit exclusions – would have achieved the 
same.
24 What one can say, however, is that the screening and unique implementation process, 
with ‘ownership’ by all member states, has come a long way in liberalising cross-border 
services business and thereby serve as a partial though significant substitute of the origin 
principle.  
Tables 8 and 9 provide some detail on establishment and cross-border barriers but are 
not suitable for zooming in on sectoral issues. For a proper understanding of the economic 
and practical effects of such barriers, it is indispensable to go beyond the summary 
information in these two tables and study the sectoral impact in some detail. This is done in a 
lengthy table in Annex 2. Since regulatory barriers can be fine-tuned in very specific ways, 
there are several layers of disaggregation one might prefer, and the most detailed one would 
amount to a huge EU handbook on services regulation applied to all sectors under the 
Directive and diversified with respect to all EU countries. Of course, a sizeable handbook 
does not serve the purposes of the present study. In Annex 2, the table focuses on six broad 
                                                 
24 The draft Bolkestein Directive of January 2004 proposed the origin principle as the basis for Art. 16, mitigated 
by lists of exclusions and derogations. After ferocious discussions, the European Parliament changed Art. 16 into 
the present one, affirming the free movement of services and deleting the origin principle. See Barnard (2008), 
Pelkmans (2007), Chang et al. (2010), Hatzopoulos (2008) and Klamert (2010).  ACCESS BARRIERS TO SERVICES MARKETS | 31 
sectors, three of which are broken down into a total of 17 subsectors with specific regulatory 
regimes. The six sectors are wholesale and retail trade (including ambulant trade, usually in 
outdoor markets), tourism (with five subsectors), construction and crafts, real estate, business 
services (with eight subsectors) and private education (with four subsectors). Despite the 
details presented, the Annex does not cover all sectoral aspects falling under the services 
Directive, but it probably catches the more important sectors in terms of restrictive regulation. 
Before we attempt to draw conclusions from this mass of regulatory details, it is important to 
realise that a singular focus on sectoral barriers ignores a view on what (sub) sectoral activity 
is not restricted. The overall perspective must include the sectors covered by the services 
Directive (see Table 7) but absent in Annex 2 and also incorporate a proxy for the economic 
significance of the (sub) sectors in Annex 2 that are hardly or not affected by restrictions. 
Indeed, as noted above as an example, quite a few restrictions have lingered in tourism but the 
economic activities in the large tourism sector (also cross-border) are only very selectively 
affected by these remaining restrictions. Finally, even where restrictions seem to go far 
(impact indicators “C” and “D”), the heterogeneity between member states is often very large, 
implying that, in many instances, the remaining restrictions only touch upon relatively few 
bilateral economic relations in the Single Market.  
In the (sub) sectors of Annex 2, many barriers have remained despite considerable 
abolition and simplification. A few statistics may help to grasp the pervasiveness and degree 
of restrictiveness of the lingering barriers: 
i)  No less than 51 types of barriers are found for ‘establishment’, such as authorisations 
and a range of so-called Art. 15 restrictions (see Table 5); note that the various Art. 15 
restrictions are seen as only ‘one’ type per sub-sector, except where they are so 
numerous as to justify disaggregated presentation. 
ii)  The degree of restrictiveness of these 51 types – still for establishment – was assessed 
(subjectively, by the authors) in the same way as in Tables 8 and 9; ‘light touch’ (A) is 
only found twice; ‘more than nuisance’ (B) is counted 48 times; ‘restrictive, anti-
competitive’ (C) is observed 42 times; and ‘severe hindrance’ (D) 25 times.
25 
iii)  No less than 33 types of barriers are found for ‘cross-border’ supply of services. 
iv)  The degree of restrictiveness of these 33 types seems, overall, less than for 
establishment: ‘light touch’ (A) is found 11 times; ‘more than nuisance’ (B) is observed 
25 times; ‘restrictive, anti-competitive’ (C) is counted 17 times; and ‘severe hindrance’ 
(D) is found 19 times. Moreover, several cross-border services are not restricted at all. It 
should also be kept in mind that, for cross-border services, the administrative 
cooperation amongst member states is greatly intensified and far more effectively 
organised (e.g. via IMI
26) than before – it is expected that this might reduce transaction 
costs for market access and foster the application of mutual recognition.  
                                                 
25 For a good understanding, the authors have scored an ‘authorisation’ as “B, C, D” because the degree of 
restrictiveness can (and does) vary, depending on requirements. Many of the “Ds” in Annex 2 originate from the 
scores of authorisations. 
26 IMI is the Internal Market Information system of the EU administrations, that is, the Commission, the national 
and regional administrations and some special governmental bodies. By late 2011, some 11,000 officials were 
using IMI and this number is rapidly increasing. IMI can be conducted in one’s own language (!) irrespective of 
the language of the counterpart. Questions may vary from verification of diplomas or specifics of technical laws 
or the reliability of inspection reports, etc. Usually, answers come in one or a few days, causing a dramatic 
shortening of procedures, information issues (e.g. posted workers) and authorisations for foreign entrants.  32 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
The toughest barriers in the case of establishment consist of (disproportional 
requirements for) authorisation, combined with restriction of the service provision to 
regulated professions. In turn, this leads to segmentation along national lines since both 
depend on national decisions, with the recognition of professional diplomas (and experience) 
having proved to be particularly difficult and cumbersome.
27 Moreover, both the firm (and 
manager) and the professional may need authorisation. Such barriers may be understandable 
(up to a point) in areas such as domestic legal services and tax advice, but become already 
less ‘typical domestic’ when it comes to accountancy/auditing, and still less for interpreters. 
Furthermore, as became more transparent with the recognition of professional diplomas in 
Directive 2005/36 and its follow-up,
28 there are many regulated professions in the EU (some 
800!) and most of them are only regulated in one or a few member states.
29 Because Annex 2 
merely zooms in on six broad sectors, many of these narrow cases remain out of sight. But a 
close reading of the Annex will show that, even in these sectors, there are a number of 
regulated professions for only a few or less than half of the member states. Whereas there can 
be little disagreement about regulated professions such as lawyers, auditors, medical doctors, 
veterinarians, patent agents, debt collectors, architects and a range of technical professions in 
the construction industry (including crafts, supervisors, elevator technicians, etc.) – although 
there are serious issues of mutual recognition between member states – this becomes much 
less clear in instances such as tourist guides (10 member states
30), real estate agents (12 EU 
countries), land surveyors (8 member states), employment agents (4 EU countries) and 
managers of driving schools (4 member states 
31).  
Finally, similar to Tables 8 and 9, it is striking to observe the incredible regulatory 
heterogeneity in Annex 2, even though the table is limited to six broad sectors where 
regulatory intervention is not surprising (hence, some degree of convergence is to be 
expected).  
4.5  Potential for a further lowering of services barriers  
There are essentially two complementary routes to a further liberalisation of the internal 
market for services, insofar as the horizontal services Directive is concerned. One is the 
harmonisation route for sectors exempted under the Directive and not enjoying a separate EU 
regulatory regime. The three important sectors having been ‘carved out’ of the Directive are 
patients’ rights in cross-border health services, gambling and private security services. The 
former activity (where patients look for treatment abroad due to quality differences, 
specialisations or waiting time) has been resolved in 2011 with Directive 2011/24. Gambling 
regulation – so far national – has received more attention recently and a Green paper was 
                                                 
27 For the sake of clarity, the services Directive does not and cannot deal with the professional qualifications 
themselves. This is a national competence. Therefore, in addition to the barrier list of Annex 2 insofar as 
regulated professions are concerned, ideally one could also add market access barriers caused by non-recognition 
or non-equivalent of diplomas and titles of professional qualifications more generally.  
28 See the Green Paper on Modernising the Professional Qualifications Directive COM (2011) 367 of 22 June 
2011 and the Commission proposal amending this Directive in COM (2011) 883 of 19 December 2011. 
29 Famous examples, for which market failures cannot be the problem, are photographer (Austria) and barman 
(Portugal).  
30 Note that most of these do imply risks: cave guides, mountain guides and ski instructors. 
31 Note that driving instructors themselves qualify as a regulated profession in most (17) member states. ACCESS BARRIERS TO SERVICES MARKETS | 33 
published in 2011, followed by a proposed EU framework for on-line gambling services.
32 
Private security services have not been resolved and await EU regulation (but seem not to be a 
priority). All three will be discussed in section 5.5.1. 
The other route consists of the follow-up of the screening and mutual evaluation, which 
has generated much greater transparency about some of the lingering problems. The European 
Commission (2011a) has proposed three avenues: a performance check, tackling remaining 
(unjustified) regulatory barriers and a number of facilitation initiatives. 
i)  The  performance check seems to have been inspired by the ‘market monitoring’ 
exercises conducted by DG EcFin since 2008 (see Ilzkovitz et al., 2008). The core issue 
is how the single services market works ‘on the ground’ for users in actual practice. 
How costly are the barriers in fact (e.g. Authorisations can take many forms and 
administrations can be slow or apply too much discretion; Do authorities use inter-
member-states’ administrative cooperation seriously?; Is there any spirit of mutual 
recognition?; etc.) and how do various EU directives interact with the provisions of the 
horizontal services Directive, such that legal uncertainty is minimised? This was 
verified in the construction sector, tourism and business services (all three in Annex 2), 
sectors with relatively sizeable cross-border services trade. It turned out
33 that not only 
was implementation at times against the services Directive but in particular the 
combination of several directives (including 2005/36 on the recognition of professional 
qualifications and some specific building-related directives) still caused companies or 
individuals to run into barriers. Remedies include more mutual recognition clauses in 
specific directives, better enforcement and further tightening on professional 
qualifications (with a detailed initiative of the Commission on regulated professions in 
2013).  
ii)  Tackling (unjustified) remaining barriers, in particular on three issues that are 
conspicuous in Tables 8 and 9 and even more in Annex 2. The first is the reservation of 
certain services to regulated professions in cases where the justification is spurious 
and/or many member states do not regulate such professions. When providers from 
many EU countries, where such activities are not reserved, wish to establish or provide 
cross-border services in EU countries having such reservations, they may find 
themselves excluded; mutual recognition will rarely be allowed. It might also affect 
their business model when trying to operate on an EU-wide basis. Of the 800 regulated 
professions in the EU, no less than 25% is regulated only in a single member state, and 
many more only in a few, leaving severe doubt about the justification under EU law. Of 
course, it must imply that numerous professions will lose the comfort of operating in a 
protected business environment and this is bound to be resisted, perhaps fiercely. A 
special case is the construction sector where, at times, very similar technical 
competences of a person in country F to the requirements of a technician in the same 
field in country G nevertheless do not lead to recognition due to extremely specific 
                                                 
32 The Green paper on on-line gambling in the internal market, COM(2011) 128 of 24 March 2011, COM(2012) 
596, 23 November 2012, Towards a comprehensive European framework for online gambling, accompanied by a 
Commission Staff Document with elaborate consideration of the grounds for regulation and supervision at the 
national level under proportionality, and the restrictions on free movement and the right of establishment, SWD 
(2012) 345, 23 November 2012. 
33 See Commission Staff Document SWD (2012) 147 of 8 June 2012 on the Results of the performance checks 
of the internal market for services. 34 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
definitions of ‘regulated’ professions.
34 Clearly, such extreme market fragmentation 
goes against the spirit of mutual recognition. Knowing that a building or major work 
will require many technical specialists, it will become next to impossible to conduct 
cross-border business except by hiring local workers. The second issue concerns legal 
form and capital ownership requirements for establishment and cross-border business 
whilst the third one consists of insurance requirements for cross-border business 
(especially when a company is already insured at home). The first two (Art. 15 
requirements, see Table 5) can be effective barriers, and may even affect the business 
model; in cross-border they might make the provision impossible. As noted before, the 
insurance condition may not only be superfluous, it might be very costly (or even 
impossible) to obtain for cross-border business (e.g. when the market for such activities 
is too small).  
iii)  A number of facilitation measures are considered by the Commission. These include an 
annual guidance document to help member states applying properly the horizontal 
clause (reflecting Art. 16), a consolidation and tightening of the notification system in 
the Directive on new regulatory initiatives on services by member states (much like the 
98/34 Directive does for technical barriers in goods markets, see Pelkmans, 2007 and 
Correia de Brito & Pelkmans, 2012) and a further assessment of the means of redress 
for consumers and SMEs.  
It should be noted that this approach was maintained in 2012 but widened by 
announcing a European Retail Action Plan and greater focus on the large and growing sector 
of Business Services.
35 
5.  Barriers in regulated services markets, outside the services Directive 
Concentrating too much on the liberalisation under the services Directive can be quite 
misleading for an economic appreciation of the functioning of the EU internal services market 
as a whole. This is true both for regulatory and for economic reasons. In fact, EU regulated 
services are as important, if not more so, for cross-border intra-EU exchange! Studying 
barriers to services exchange in the EU implies studying barriers in the EU regulated services 
markets as well.  
The economic reasons are not difficult to see. As shown in Mustilli & Pelkmans (2012), 
intra-EU trade in services is dominated by services under the Directive (63%) – still, one-third 
is outside it – but intra-EU FDI in services is dominated by regulated services such as 
financial services (61%) and network industries (10%). In terms of EU GDP, the four 
regulated (market) services categories generate some 20%.  
The regulatory reasons can be understood from Figure 1 which gives the full panorama 
of (non-government) services in the EU internal market. In this stylised view, the services 
Directive occupies the upper left box, governing the internal market regime for the services 
listed there (see also section 4).  
                                                 
34 The European Commission (2012, p. 7) gives the example of an ‘electrical technician’ who is prevented from 
executing highly specific activities in his field (in the other country) because they are reserved for ‘electrical 
equipment installers’.  
35 In COM(2012) 261 of 8 June 2012 on the implementation of the services Directive. For Business Services, a 
High Level Group on Business Services has meanwhile been appointed, expected to come with detailed 
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Figure 1. Internal Services Market: Sectors under the services Directive 2006/123 and EU regulatory regimes 
Services Directive 
•  Business services (consultancy, certification 
and testing, services, commercial agents, 
industrial cleaning)  
•  B2C and B2B: Legal/fiscal advice, real estate 
services, construction (incl. architects); 
wholesale and retail; trade fairs, car rental, 
travel agencies  
•  Tourism, leisure services, sports centres, 
amusement parks, household support services  
•  Private educational services  
EU REG REGIME (1) 
Financial Markets 
•  Banking  
•  Insurance  
•  Investment services  
•  Asset management  
•  REG for market failures and 
financial (system) stability 
(national and EU) supervision  
EU REG REGIME (2) 
Network Sector Services 
•  Broadcasting  
•  eCommunications  
•  Gas/electricity  
•  Postal  
•  Air/rail transport  
EU REG REGIME (3) 
Transport  
•  Road haulage  
•  River and maritime  
•  Bus and coach  
•  Air/rail (see network 
services)  
•  REG for SHEC-type 
market failures  
•  EU safety agencies (air, 
rail, maritime)  
EU REG REGIME (4) 
Professional Services 
•  Nationally regulated 
but diploma 
recognition under 
Dir. 36/2005  
•  New proposal with 
professional card 
•  EU-wide self-
regulatory codes 
under services Dir. 
EU REG REGIME (5) 
Sensitive Services 
•  Private security 
services (blocked) 
•  Cross-border health 
services (Dir. 
7053/2011)  
•  Gambling and related 
(status?) 
EU REG REGIME (6) 
Temporary Cross-border 
Services 
•  Services themselves (often) 
under the services Directive, 
but, for posted workers, 
host-country control and 
notification requirements 
(Dir. 96/71) 36 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
Most of these services are lightly (or sometimes, not) regulated at EU level. They may 
be regulated at national level and Directive 2006/123 disciplines this regulation whilst 
explicitly forbidding a range of impediments to market access, whether cross-border or via 
establishment. For some of these services, complementary EU regulation may facilitate the 
working of the Single Market in the presence of potentially fragmenting national regulation, 
the most prominent example being the recognition of diplomas for (nationally) regulated 
professions. The recent EU attempts to make progress in this difficult area are incorporated in 
Figure 1 in one of the other boxes, but they interact with the upper left box.  
Figure 1 clearly shows that the internal services market consists of six sectoral EU 
regulatory regimes, besides the services Directive. Again, this renders it indispensable to 
discuss these special regulatory regimes and ask the question what the remaining barriers are, 
if any, in these domains. In none of these six regimes has EU regulation (as well as cross-
border liberalisation and EU competition policy where relevant) proceeded so far that all 
barriers to services exchange have been removed, although one sector (transport) has come 
rather far. 
For the present purposes, it is neither possible nor desirable to analyse in full detail 
these six regimes and the remaining barriers. We have opted for an intermediary level of 
specification which is concrete and practical enough for underpinning an eventual economic 
assessment of remaining barriers. Such an approach requires a separate discussion of each one 
of the six regimes, because they are all distinct and involve specialist knowledge about sectors 
and market failures.  
5.1  The EU financial markets regime and remaining barriers 
Nowadays the EU financial markets regime is advanced. Yet, two types of ‘barriers’ to 
financial services exchange remain: design-related barriers and barriers due to the failure to 
‘complete’ the internal financial market based on removal of obstacles between the member 
states. For a good understanding, a brief digression is unavoidable.  
Before the financial crisis starting late 2008, the EU made three attempts to remove ever 
more barriers between member states and thereby deepen and widen its internal financial 
services and capital market. The first one during the 1970s, focused on the early 
implementation of the right of establishment (no more than a beginning for barriers to 
unhindered establishment and no solution for cross-border services). The EC-1992 period 
brought a breakthrough with the second banking Directive (and some other directives on e.g. 
on large exposures and solvency) and related EU regulation for insurance and investment 
services, besides the prohibition of exchange controls. The third generation consisted of the 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) (with the special Lamfalussy procedure of delegated 
implementation legislation), a total of 43 directives and regulations between 2000 and 2006.  
The FSAP was initially regarded as a success, despite (mainly) academic criticism on 
some fundamental features and its ‘light touch’ regulatory approach. The criticism of its 
design turned out to be correct, although the consequences and scale of the subsequent crisis 
were foreseen by almost nobody.
36 The important weakness, perhaps a fatal flaw, was the 
combination of a ‘too-light’ risk approach, with the absence of any common authority and 
monitoring of EU-wide (or eurozone-wide) financial stability. This systemic flaw resulted 
                                                 
36 There have been authoritative, early warnings at the highest level of governance of the financial and monetary 
system. Prof. Rajan (2005), then Chief Economist of the IMF, warned the central bankers, meeting in Wyoming 
in their annual informal retreat, in a well-argued paper but he was conveniently ignored or belittled.  ACCESS BARRIERS TO SERVICES MARKETS | 37 
 
from two interacting sources of inhibition: i) supervisory authorities were national and their 
soft cooperation at EU level was totally inadequate to deal with instabilities or large 
insolvencies once they would occur (with a complete failure to address the 55 large financial 
conglomerates working cross-border in the EU); and ii) the lack of preparedness to centralise 
(especially supervision) at EU or eurozone level even where the economic case was strong. 
The upshot was that, after 10 years of a successful eurozone, the absence of EU supervision 
and of a common, effective bank resolution system (with joint funds) together with the ‘light’ 
risk approach, allowed contagion to turn into unexpected, massive threats (even spilling over 
to sovereign bond markets, hence affecting ratings of different EU countries), prompted 
several internationalised banks to be broken up along national lines and caused enormous 
national state aids to national financial institutions, which should never have happened in the 
first place. All three can be seen as severe design failures of the internal market but just as 
much as barriers to intra-EU financial opportunities. The internal market had become far 
more risky in the absence of a truly Europeanised regime for bank resolution, also cross-
border. The EU lacked a financial stability regime (including the absence of a lender-of-last-
resort function), for dealing with a systemic failure. The ensuing, dramatic worsening of the 
fiscal imbalances of the member states led to the emergence of extreme risk-pricing and 
interest disparities in sovereign bond markets
37 and the drying-up of the European interbank 
market due to a lack of trust.  
The fourth regime (late 2008-12) constitutes a brave attempt to address all these issues. 
Supervision has been consolidated, to a degree, in three EU agencies (for banking, insurance 
and investment services), a European Financial Stability Board has been founded (with 
explicit links with the supervisors), a more sophisticated risk-based approach to banking has 
been enacted (with higher capital requirements once more risk is taken), alternative 
investment funds (or, rather, their managers) have become monitored and lightly regulated, 
credit rating agencies have become regulated such that conflicts of interests cannot easily 
occur, bonuses and remuneration questions have been addressed in corporate governance of 
banks in modest ways, several directives have been revised (e.g. for investment services – 
MIFID – and mutual funds) and bank resolution proposals have been tabled, although the 
central sticking point (burden-sharing for international banks or joint funds for this purpose, 
and prior rules to execute the funding, so as to avoid emergency negotiations in weekends) is 
not yet fully resolved. This paper will not discuss all these elements. The fourth regime is no 
doubt much better than the third, but the persistent query by academic observers and think-
tanks remains: Is it enough for the internal market to be crisis-proof? Is the better functioning 
of the internal financial market guaranteed, once the crisis is over? Will there no longer be 
design-barriers to EU financial integration? The answer to these queries hinges on the final 
result of the bank resolution regime and the agreed burden-sharing as well as on the eventual 
degree of centralisation that the EU can accept.  
The other query for this paper is: Has the fourth regime also been capable of clearing all 
intra-EU barriers out of the way? The answer is: There are still some significant barriers left. 
At the moment of writing, the prevention of re-emerging failures of the internal financial 
market takes absolute priority for the EU. Removing the remaining barriers is now a lesser 
problem. But the IMF does not see it that way. Quite the contrary, it regards further deepening 
and removal of lingering barriers as a handmaiden for the exit from the crisis. Its view on 
                                                 
37 In the ten years since the euro decision was taken (May 1998), financial markets behaved “as if” the respective 
national fiscal imbalances did not matter for risk pricing of sovereign bonds of eurozone member states, despite 
considerable differences in debt ratios. By the autumn of 2008, this had altered radically.  38 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
today’s barriers inside the EU is revealing: “The crisis in Europe was prolonged by the 
incomplete integration of the financial system. … (H)ome bias in portfolio allocations, 
securitisation is very much a national affair (for example, no uniform mortgage contract 
exists) and cross-border retail banking is virtually non-existent; cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions are still limited.” It also lambasts the mindset of the European financial elite, 
private or public:”…the desire to maintain national champions, … take advantage of 
regulatory and supervisory arbitrage and retain full national accountability for explicit and 
implicit guarantees” (IMF, 2011, pp. 69-72). These problems may have different roots: for 
mortgages,
38 a key issue is national tax deductibility of (some of) the interest paid; for retail 
banking a major problem is the nationally quite distinct consumer protection regimes (besides 
the low switching rates in retail banking all over Europe which may forever marginalise a 
new entrant); for mergers and acquisitions, corporate law is only partly Europeanised and tax 
issues differ between member states; and, finally, the taste for national champions will not 
become sour before a truly European regime (including common funds) of bank resolution 
will be in existence. The removal of these four ‘barriers’ can only be expected if and when the 
other, often sensitive, policy domains mentioned here, are addressed with the better 
functioning of the single market in mind.  
5.2  Network industries and lingering barriers in the internal market  
Although a lot has been achieved in opening up the seven relevant
39 network industries 
(broadcasting, postal, eCommunications, gas and electricity, rail and air transport), there are 
some weaknesses in three sectoral internal market regimes but severe flaws in four others 
(preventing an internal market from coming into being). The discussion below has to be 
succinct and focuses merely on the identification of the main issues.
40 Table 10 provides an 
overview employing key words only. The table demonstrates that there is no genuine internal 
market for network industries’ services in four out of seven industries. In broadcasting, postal 
and air transport, on the other hand, the problems are relatively minor and some are known to 
be temporary anyway.  
The barriers to EU-wide services exchange in eCommunications, electricity, gas and 
freight rail
41 are formidable. This is not to say that the gradual liberalisation in these network 
markets has not already had some pro-competitive effects and prompted efficiency gains (see 
European Commission, 2013). The point is simply that, in order to reap the full economic 
gains from intra-EU market integration, these formidable barriers will have to be overcome. It 
                                                 
38 Mortgage loans in the eurozone can now be contracted cross-border without any exchange risk; outside the 
eurozone, to engage in euro-denominated mortgage loans seems too risky in this respect. 
39 ‘Relevant’ refers to EU-relevant, in other words, with actual or potential cross-border economic intercourse. 
Some network industries are local (e.g. urban transport) and other ones have virtually no cross-border trade (such 
as drinking water).  
40 For detailed economic surveys of the single market of network industries, see Pelkmans & Luchetta (2013) 
and European Commission (2013). The latter also provides a good summary of the current EU regulatory regime 
in the more ‘difficult’ network industries. 
41 Note that the case for a competitive EU-wide passenger rail market is far weaker and selective. The demand 
for cross-border (long distance) passenger rail is relatively small (also given intermodal competition) and there 
are limits to (efficient) entry in this market. Freight rail, on the other hand, is by nature usually cross-border in 
Europe where almost all countries are relatively small in territory. Freight rail can be competitive, for the typical 
goods it can carry efficiently (e.g. less value, more weight; and/or goods not under just-in-time systems), starting 
from 400 – 500 km and becomes attractive for commercial shippers for (say) distances above 1,000 km. Of 
course, this still depends on efficient intermodal hubs and business models.  ACCESS BARRIERS TO SERVICES MARKETS | 39 
 
is probably hazardous to try to ‘estimate’ the magnitudes of such economic gains, given the 
complicated nature of the barriers indicated, and the dynamic effects that the future absence of 
these barriers is likely to engender, but it seems plausible to expect very considerable long-
run gains.  
Take eCommunications (Pelkmans & Renda, 2011), which is characterised by huge 
intra-EU price disparities in the 11 most important eComms services, ranging from a few 
hundreds of percent to several thousands. It does not require much fantasy to expect great 
economic gains if price disparities would be forced, by genuine EU-wide competition and 
consolidation of the telecoms industry, down to a range of (say) ‘only’ 100% [still wider than 
in many other sectors]. The problem is that the EU requirements to achieve such 
consolidation and price convergence are unlike the typical barriers under (say) the services 
Directive or, for that matter once upon a time, in EU goods markets. It would require an 
overhaul of the EU approach in this sector away from giving so much power to NRAs, 
allowing much more centralisation (that is, radically upgrading BEREC and endowing it with 
centralised functions, above all, to ensure a proper functioning of the internal eComms 
market) and revising EU regulation (including licensing) to accommodate that. This should of 
course be complemented by EU competition policy.  
This is not the place to elaborate on such ideas. But it goes without saying that these 
changes would amount to a revolution in eComms circles and – going by the resistance of 
NRAs and the national governments to the emergence of a very weak BEREC in 2009 – are 
bound to be fought by vested interests. Another pointer of the untapped potential of the 
internal eComms market is the splintering of the EU’s telecoms business: whereas the US has 
five to seven big operators, the EU has (depending how one counts) several hundred up to 
over one thousand or more. This is only sustainable because fragmentation is allowing 
numerous niche positions in national markets which would, for the most part, be wiped out by 
competitive pan-European operators forcing much higher efficiency.  
With due respect to the considerable sectoral differences in gas, electricity and freight 
rail, the basic problem of realising a genuine internal market without barriers is quite similar. 
All three incipient internal markets suffer from major infrastructural problems, combined with 
very high national concentration ratios (i.e. too little entry) and a lack of centralisation, in 
particular the absence of a common EU regulator. The most profound problem is found in 
rail: the transformation of and investment in rail infrastructure towards a suitable and modern 
(e.g. signalling and interoperability, allowing a higher speed) set of European freight 
corridors, with routine priority for freight rail (minimising the costs of dual-use), with many 
intermodal hubs and without suffering from frontier stops or other problems such as lack of 
traction. These major problems are exacerbated by highly distortive and disparate access 
pricing policies at national level which complicate freight efficiency since freight routes tend 
to go through three, four or five countries with radically different charges. The lack of an EU 
regulator, or even an autonomous Agency,
42 further weakens the EU internal market regime 
for rail.
43 
                                                 
42 ERA (European Rail Agency) deals solely with technical safety and interoperability questions, not with 
ensuring market conduct, slot allocation, access pricing, proper implementation or other questions related to the 
proper functioning of the internal rail freight market. 
43 Some further issues of the lack of competition and efficiency in European rail are discussed in Crozet et al., 
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Table 10. Barriers in the internal market for network industries  
Sector  Impact  Nature of barriers 
Broadcasting Light  Broadcasting Directive 2007/65 based on origin (‘place of transmission’) 
principle, so genuinely free; technology (especially cable) and copyright 
still fragments the internal market to some extent; webcasting only weak 
substitute 
Postal Light  Postal Directive 2008/6 implies full liberalisation by 2011 (for some 
countries, 2013); (limited) price regulation, wage setting for full-time and 
part-time postal workers and (limited) discretion for national postal 
regulators may still segment markets along national lines; however, most 
postal is B2B and B2C (e.g. direct mail), email is powerful substitute (no 
barriers) and parcel mail highly competitive EU-wide; Reims-V (quality 
guaranteed cross-border mail at agreed, cost-reflective prices) agreement 
promotes market integration, but ought to be flexible and open 
Air transport  Light  Fully free for intra-EU air services (cargo, passengers); some lingering 
restrictions due to bilaterals with (some) 3
rd countries; splintered air traffic 
controls are on the way out with SESAR-II and new IT infrastructure  
Electricity Severe  3
rd package (2009) improvement, but insufficient; cross-border 
interconnectors too often congested, despite greater efficiency with power 
exchanges; wholesale markets not (yet) competitive enough; national HHI 
indices far too high; lack of conducive investment climate given formidable 
investment needs (including EU-wide grids and replacement of power 
stations) and uncertainty about sustainability constraints (such as 
renewables and the low price of carbon); ACER Agency too weak to ensure 
genuine internal market (given NRAs) 
Gas Severe  3
rd package (2009) improvement but insufficient; EU gas networks 
unfinished; national HHI indices even higher than in electra; severe gas 
security-of-supply problem (now reduced by LNG and possibly shale gas); 
gas hubs (wholesale) still few and too illiquid, though growing rapidly; gas 
exchanges too ‘thin’; fragmentation profound e.g. due to medium-run 
capacity reservation of pipelines and storage; investment incentives via 
exemption of TPA show dilemma between security of supply and intra-EU 
competition; ACER too weak to ensure a single market (see electra) but 
development of ‘network codes’ (under way) would be pro-competitive and 
improve the single market 
eCommunications Severe Success of EU telecoms (eComms) due to interaction of technical progress 
and market liberalisation; hides the fact that liberalisation is largely 
‘national’, managed by NRAs based on EU regulation (and some 
competition policy); no such thing as an eComms Single market, shown by 
huge price disparities, lack of convergence in applied rules, no EU-wide 
service providers, little consolidation of industry and a stubborn broadband 
gap; BEREC ‘Agency’ distinctly weaker than ACER – NRAs are stumbling 
block to single market; series of other barriers to a single ‘digital market’ 
currently being addressed (such as more EU-oriented spectrum 
programmes, pan-EU licensing for on-line rights management and 
harmonised numbering to enable EU-wide provision of business services); 
investment incentives in advanced networks problematic, might harden 
fragmentation  
(Freight) rail  (Very) 
severe 
Economic case for EU-wide freight rail powerful, yet the barriers are the 
most severe of all network industries; overriding problem is the unsuitable 
‘installed base’ (of infrastructure) which is extremely expensive to 
overcome and will take decades; key infra problems: networks built as 
‘national’, hence, cross border ‘missing links’, ‘dual-use’ tradition in 
Europe (adding 40% to costs), huge NIMBY issues for new infra, long 
European freight ‘corridors’ require many costly adaptations at many levels 
and, given EU density, difficult to accomplish, interoperability questions 
(ERA Agency is purely technical) and a need for many efficient intermodal ACCESS BARRIERS TO SERVICES MARKETS | 41 
 
hubs; moreover, profound investment incentive issue as the pan-European 
uncertainty about freight rail competitiveness lingers on, creating a vicious 
circle; besides infra, two other serious constraints, which will take time as 
well: the business models and mentality of freight rail companies in Europe 
have to be transformed radically, and, national freight access (to track) 
charges vary by hundreds of percent (deeply distortive); although national 
regulators have to be ‘independent’, conflicts of interest (with the 
incumbent) are not fully excluded; there is no EU-wide regulator for general 
market access, slot allocation and track charges; implementation of several 
rail packages by member states is seriously deficient  
Note: NRA = national regulatory agency; TPA = third party access; LNG = liquified natural gas; ERA = European Rail 
Agency; ACER = EU Agency for electricity and gas; BEREC = EU Body for Electronic Communications (formally, 
not an EU agency). 
In electricity and gas, the natural monopolies (transmission and distribution networks) 
have gradually been subjected to a stricter EU regime. Nevertheless, also here the 
infrastructural questions are paramount as Table 10 describes. In electricity several cross-
border interconnectors suffer from congestion permanently and investment incentives to build 
new ones are subject to improvement, to put it mildly (Kapff & Pelkmans, 2010). In gas new 
pipelines  can  be exempted from TPA (third party access) under strict conditions since a 
temporary exclusive use may serve as an incentive to attract investors. Both sectors face 
enormous investment challenges in the next two decades anyway, both in infrastructure and 
power stations. Moreover, in electricity there is the non-trivial question of how to 
accommodate renewables such as wind power (which is irregular) and this issue may have 
negative externalities for neighbouring countries’ networks as well (e.g. Germany causing 
problems for adjacent countries with either too much windpower in a particular period during 
a day or an acute shortage at other times. In both sectors, there is an EU Agency (ACER) that 
is advisory (it can take highly technical decisions in some cases and serve as intermediator 
between NRAs as well) whilst also stimulating and supervising the ten-year investment plans 
on infrastructure (executed by ENTSO, the association of national transmission systems 
operators). However, it cannot ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, far from 
it.  
5.3  Barriers in the internal market for transport services 
The present subsection on transport will not deal with air and rail transport since this is 
discussed in subsection 5.2. The internal market for transport in the other four modes (road 
haulage, river transport, maritime – especially coastal shipping – and bus and coach transport) 
is functioning quite well. In 1985, the CJEU convicted the EU Council of Transport Ministers 
for a “failure to act” to implement the common transport policy as the treaty proscribes. Since 
that year, the EU has undertaken a steady liberalisation of the four modes, including 
cabotage,
44 supplemented by a relatively modest set of common rules for safety, environment 
and social concerns (e.g. maximum hours of driving a day for international road haulage). EU 
competition policy has complemented this where necessary, for example by lifting the 
exemption for international liner conferences in maritime. The EU has also attempted to 
introduce unhindered access to and more competition in certain harbours which use a 
                                                 
44 The only restriction left is that cabotage rights hinge on the condition of the truck having previously operated 
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restrictive system of assigning cargo for handling, but with mixed success.
45 Apparently, there 
are also issues of the (non-)transparency of state funds for port development affecting 
negatively inter-port competition in the internal market.
46 The lingering policy issues in EU 
transport are, on the whole, no longer found in intra-EU barriers but in the facilitation of 
intermodal transport, a range of environmental issues and ‘green transport’, appropriate road 
pricing, standardisation of electronic toll gate systems (indeed, an internal market issue but 
more an irritant), a range of innovative solutions for infrastructure as well as transport 
management systems and some cross-border corridor questions such as long tunnels in the 
Alpine regions and ‘missing links’ between national road systems.  
The ambitious strategy to arrive at a Single European Transport Area
47 emphasises 
mainly the further ‘greening’ of transport (for environmental reasons and on grounds of 
energy security), the aggressive development of innovative new technical (including ICT) and 
interoperability solutions, a transformation towards common multi-modal systems for long-
distance transport (which requires huge investments, common standards and a great deal of 
coordination) as well as Europe-wide freight rail corridors,
48 a maritime ‘Blue Belt’ of free 
movement around the EU and many proposals on safety and passenger rights, etc. This more 
‘integrated’ approach (integrated, that is, between transport modes and also integrated in the 
sense of a genuine level-playing field on pricing for the internalisation of externalities such as 
pollution, accidents, noise and congestion) has profound and long-term implications.  
For the present purposes, this prompts the following questions: What are the real 
‘barriers’ in the internal market? What are the ‘distortions’? Where to draw the line? Clearly, 
removing classical market access barriers is hardly the issue anymore in EU transport (with 
the exception of some minor cabotage questions, harbour access in only a few instances and a 
few rail issues like single EU vehicle-type authorisation by the rail agency ERA), except for 
one lingering question. In maritime transport, the handling of customs documents, inspections 
and other treatment upon arrival in EU harbours is identical between EU-originating ships and 
vessels coming from other parts of the world. In the recent Single Market Act II,
49 the 
Commission has finally committed to propose arrangements not substantially different from 
intra-EU transport. But classical access barriers aside, the ‘technical efficiency’ of the 
exploitation of the Single Market can be enormously improved, once the coordination, 
interoperability, large and multi-annual investments, transport management systems and 
logistical innovations have been upgraded and adapted. Distortions like sticking to different 
cost methodologies for internalisation, primarily due to protectionist reasons or fear of 
adjustment, or a lack of coordination or of infrastructural investments, which would seem to 
appear as ‘barriers’ later on (because congestion or bottlenecks hinder smooth EU-wide 
transport, or incompatibilities) could all be regarded as the ‘new’ obstacles to an efficiency-
improving, modernised truly European transport system. This leads to the perhaps somewhat 
curious conclusion that the near-absence of classical market access barriers – a victory in 
European market integration – would be a mistaken and far too narrow perspective for the 
assessment of the internal transport market of the future.  
                                                 
45 The 2005 draft Directive for access rights to EU ports was rejected by the EP after violent protests in 
Strasbourg and a soft law approach has been used since. 
46 European Commission (2013, p. 18). 
47 COM (2011) 144 of 28 March 2011, White Paper, Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area. 
48 See for detail COM (2010) 474 of 17 September 2010, The development of a Single European Railway Area. 
49 Single Market Act II of 3 October 2012, COM (2012) 573. ACCESS BARRIERS TO SERVICES MARKETS | 43 
 
5.4  Barriers in the internal market for services of professionals  
As noted before, there is no EU regime for the substantive regulation of professionals and the 
supply of their services. Having said that, one should immediately add that ‘mutual 
recognition’ of diplomas has been attempted early on, in particular for the professions.
50 For 
decades, however, negotiations for architects, medical doctors, pharmacists, accountants, 
lawyers, etc. were hijacked by closed and protective lobbies of professionals from the 
member states, which agreed on interpreting ‘mutual recognition’ as a form of ‘maximum 
harmonisation’. This meant that the heaviest possible requirements for recognition would 
prevail, complemented by national aptitude tests with lengthy preparation, thereby rendering 
market access between EU countries extremely small, if not ‘residual’. This boiled down to 
total protection and a complete lack of pro-competitive entry from other EU countries. It goes 
without saying that this ‘harmonisation’ has nothing to do with either ‘mutual recognition’ or 
with its objective, that is, least-cost solutions for effective market access without undermining 
the SHEIC objectives behind the regulation of professional services and their suppliers.  
Since 1989, a new approach has been initiated, inspired by ‘mutual recognition’ in 
goods and some services, which has culminated in easier recognition of a range of professions 
(like teachers) during the late 1990s. Meanwhile, medical and para-medical professions enjoy 
a mobility-friendly regime of automatic recognition. No less than 15 separate directives for 
many well-known professions (except lawyers and commercial agents) were consolidated in 
an omnibus Directive 2005/36. The services Directive 2006/123 also matters, although it is 
complementary to the professional qualifications Directive 2005/36. It matters because it 
imposes far-reaching inter-member-state administrative cooperation (crucial in the case of 
recognition of many diplomas from no less than 27 countries) and Points of Single Contact 
(idem), for example.  
In 2013, a summary of the EU system of recognition of professional qualifications is as 
follows:  
a.  In seven professions, harmonisation of minimum (training) requirements has been 
accomplished: six in health (doctors, nurses, dentists, midwives, veterinary surgeons 
and pharmacists) plus architects. Such harmonisation leads, by definition, to automatic 
recognition. There are lingering concerns about language tests given the preoccupation 
of patients.  
b.  Mutual recognition of qualifications applies, in principle, to all other professions, some 
800 in the EU (although no less than 43% of those are in health or are health-related), 
under the so-called ‘general system’ (dating back to 1989); such mutual recognition is 
of course conditional on certain requirements, but the idea is that equivalence  (of 
professional competence) prevails, not identical requirements in training, etc. Apart 
from lawyers and commercial agents (see below), all the rules are incorporated in 
Directive 2005/36. 
c.  The professions in craft, commerce and industry also enjoy automatic recognition, but 
here, of professional experience. 
d.  There is a special regime for lawyers and one for self-employed commercial agents 
(Directive 86/653/EEC; the reason being a matter of civil law, normally not an EU 
matter, about the relationship between the agent and the principal).  
                                                 
50 Note that the term ‘mutual recognition of diplomas’ has already been written into the Treaty of Rome. This 
provision was never changed; see Art. 53, TFEU. 44 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
The internal market for professional services is still rather restricted, despite the 
significant improvements recently made. In Tables 8 and 9 as well as in Annex 2, one will 
observe that numerous problems still arise in the internal services market due to reservation of 
activities to certain regulated professions. On the other hand, there are several signs of greater 
cross-border activity, whether establishment or cross-border temporary services. First, data 
show that the system begins to work. Between 1997 and 2008, 70% of recognition requests 
succeeded, 13% were not settled because e.g. candidates were still following a course, 9% 
were successful only after a required adaptation period and 8% were denied.
51 By spring 
2011, some 200,000 EU citizens had been seeking recognition of their qualification in another 
EU member state, but these Commission counts are known to be an underestimate. 
Figure 2 provides empirical evidence about the sectoral composition of these mobile 
professionals. For those with harmonised training requirements, the health professionals take 
the lion’s share (21%), with architects assuming only 2%. This might be interpreted to mean 
that this system works for health (if harmonised).
52 Would the mere 2% imply that it does not 
seem to work for architects? Not necessarily. There are far fewer architects than health 
professionals, to begin with – if the propensity to be mobile across intra-EU borders would be 
the same between health and architects, the number of architects would still be much smaller. 
Moreover, one should realize that, for architects, it is generally much harder to build up a 
clientele of their own in another country – it would presumably be easier when contracted as 
an employee. As to other professionals, mobility is significant for teachers (27%), health 
professionals not covered by harmonisation (23%), craftsmen and transport professionals. 
For the other groups, one might suspect that lingering barriers remain important. The 
European engineers have recently introduced an EU-wide professional card, which allows 
almost immediate mutual recognition given the data on the card and the electronic support 
from the relevant institutions in each EU country. Lawyers have a natural barrier in that local 
language and profound knowledge of national laws are an obvious prerequisite for successful 
mobility, unless their legal services are directly linked to services to multinationals. 
Moreover, becoming a member of the national Bar tends to be restricted by considerable 
‘stages’ (traineeships) or other requirements plus a strict test, which in principle may be non-
discriminatory but still signify a tough barrier to overcome for many non-locals. Such barriers 
are at times perhaps a bit too heavy (or take too long) but broadly speaking unobjectionable. 
For accountants/auditors/tax advisors, Tables 8 and 9 and Annex 2 demonstrate that barriers 
here are high. One also has to take into account (which is not mentioned in Tables 8 and 9 nor 
in the annex) that, for accounting/auditing, restrictions often apply to individual auditors as 
well as to accounting firms!
53 However, the enormous fragmentation in accounting inside the 
EU internal market also hinges on other fundamental factors, which is signalled by the 
country-by-country set-up of even the largest four accountancy majors. The principal reasons 
                                                 
51 Internal Market Scoreboard, July 2010, pp. 30–31. 
52 This seems consistent with recent empirical work by the European Observatory on health systems and policies. 
See Wismar et al. (2011). They find that in half of the EU countries foreign doctors make up more than 10% of 
the EU workforce, with 43% for the UK (also non-EU), 25% for Belgium and 13% for Austria. As a share of the 
workforce, foreign nurses make up 28% in Italy, 15% in the UK and 14% in Belgium. Foreign dentists make up 
43% of the Finnish workforce, 41% in Austria, etc. The flows are mainly east-west in the EU and have declined 
after the 2004 and 2007 accessions. For example, the peak of inflows into the UK from the new EU member 
states was in 2005 with 1,792 doctors and 305 midwives and nurses; by 2008 it was down to 970 doctors but up 
for nurses and midwives to 932. The study does not report serious barriers to recognition. 
53 Readers wishing to peruse a quick survey of how complicated this is are referred to Pelkmans (2006), Case 
Study 7.1, pp. 130-131, on accountancy services in the internal market. ACCESS BARRIERS TO SERVICES MARKETS | 45 
 
behind this curious structure are the question of liability (with significant differences in legal 
regimes between member states, besides distinct cultures in this respect) and the decreasing 
availability of professional indemnity insurance for large trans-national audit assignments.
54 
However, both our tables + the Annex as well as the data in Monteagudo et al. (2012) indicate 
that some abolition of barriers has taken place as well as considerable reduction of 
restrictiveness in both accounting and the area of tax advisors.  
Figure 2. Cross-border mobility of professionals 1997–2008 
 
Note: Percentage of decisions (positive or negative) for different sectors based on information from member 
states and EEA countries and entered into the database up to 02/2010. CY, CZ, EE, ES, PT and RO have 
not provided figures for 2008 yet on recognition of qualifications. 
Source: Internal Market Scoreboard (European Commission, 2010). 
Another attempt by the Commission is its proposal
55 to modernise the approach of 
2005/36 further. One (proposed) obligation would be for member states to (re)evaluate the list 
of regulated professions in their country, see what regulation is perhaps not necessary, and, if 
maintained, to explain to the Commission and other member states what the overriding reason 
of the public interest is that leads the government to uphold the rule.
56 If this proposal would 
be adopted, it would undoubtedly generate fascinating debates between member states (but 
also public debates) about the merits of such regulated protection in many instances. The end 
result is likely to be easier market access and fewer barriers. A Commission report is expected 
in 2013.  
                                                 
54 A detailed and insightful analysis can be found in FEE (2008).  
55 See COM (2011) 883 of 19 December 2011 and the Impact Assessment under SEC (2011) 1558 , same date. 
56 Since all member states would have to notify this, a kind of mutual evaluation between member states would 
emerge. Although the Commission employs language like “to simplify” their regulatory approaches, while 
serving “transparency”, it is obvious that such an exercise might be seen as rather sensitive by some professions. 46 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
Nonetheless, the failure rate of 30% and experiences with SOLVIT and the CSS 
(Citizen Signpost Service)
57 demonstrate that the problems with professional qualifications 
are numerous. The proposal addresses some of the issues, mostly related to modernisation (of 
harmonisation, for example) and lowering transaction and information costs (via an EU 
professional card system, intense inter-member state administrative cooperation and a reform 
of rules for temporary services provision by professionals). As far as administrative 
cooperation is concerned, which is crucial in this domain as SOLVIT has shown, the use of 
the IMI (Internal Market Information) system
58 is proposed to become obligatory for all 
matters concerning recognition of professional qualifications. This may also enhance legal 
certainty and speed whilst lowering transaction costs. 
As this subsection shows, it is clear that intra-EU mobility of professionals is easier 
today than, say, two decades ago. Indications to this effect (see before) are in the qualitative 
description of considerable improvements in the EU recognition regime and in the rather large 
actual cross-border intra-EU flows of professionals as documented between 1997 and 2008. 
Nevertheless, it is still extremely difficult to come up with appropriate counts or measurement 
of the remaining barriers in the internal market for professional services and the actual or 
potential economic impact of such barriers. One of the proxies to get around this lack of direct 
observation or plain statistics of barriers is found in quantitative techniques which start from 
the restrictiveness of national regulation (e.g. the PMRs of the OECD, see section 6). 
For this subsection, it is interesting to provide a prelude on this analysis following 
recent OECD work. Restrictiveness of (here) the national regulation of professional services 
(including who can perform them, given the conditions to become a professional in a 
particular field) leads to two kinds of ‘barriers’. First, a relatively restrictive regime for 
professionals reduces entry into that specific market, both for locals and for non-nationals 
(from the EU). Nevertheless, the efforts and/or costs in meeting the conditions are typically 
less for nationals than for non-nationals, except in special cases (e.g. when having studied in a 
host country where one wishes to stay). Suppose that all member states have an identical 
regime for professional services X but this regime is relatively restrictive.
59 If so, such a set of 
identical national regimes is nevertheless likely to restrict cross-border flows of professionals 
(for establishment) more than it would restrict domestic entry; in other words, it induces a 
‘home bias’. Second, in actual practice, these national regimes are of course anything but 
identical. Indeed, they are different in many ways and the overlap differs time and again in 
any bilateral comparison. Such heterogeneity matters too (as dealt with more systematically in 
section 7). Thus, if one follows successfully the education plus training for profession K in 
country A, not knowing yet that, later, one might seek establishment in country B, one might 
incur costs of adaptation that may well differ depending on which country B actually is. If the 
professional is an individual, heterogeneity is less relevant, because the professional merely 
                                                 
57 For SOLVIT, see its 2010 report and the strategic review of SOLVIT [Reinforcing effective problem-solving 
in the Single Market, of February 2012] (both at: ec.europa.eu/solvit); and for CSS (Citizen Signpost Service), 
see their report of 28 February 2010 analysing 673 cases on qualifications in 2009: “The mobility of 
professionals in practice” (ec.europa.eu/citizensrights).  
58 IMI is a secure, online application that allows national, regional and local authorities to communicate with 
their counterparts abroad. For more on IMI, see its annual report for 2011 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/imi-net/docs/ar2011.pdf). 
59 ‘Relatively restrictive’ implies either a comparative judgement (with, say, other OECD countries) or an 
assessment of the market failures which have to be overcome with such regulation. Ideally (indeed, under EU 
law!), one should regulate proportionally, that is, no more than necessary in order to overcome the market 
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wants to establish in one country only. But if professional services are provided in the 
framework of larger firms (say law firms, accountancy firms, engineering companies, 
architectural firms), heterogeneity adds considerable costs to a Europeanisation strategy, since 
there are fixed costs of entry that will have to be incurred for each country and will also differ 
in each case. If restrictions would be perfectly identical, perhaps an EU mutual recognition 
regime could be set up, cutting dramatically the costs of entry into national markets given the 
once-accepted fulfilment of the conditions. This is far more difficult or even impossible under 
heterogeneity, and is bound to add entry costs, which cumulate with the greater coverage of 
the 27 EU countries (or, 30 EEA ones). In turn, this is bound to influence structures and 
conduct of local professional service providers resulting, one would expect, in less 
competitive national markets. If restrictiveness is high and heterogeneity great, the internal 
market may even become a ‘residual’ market despite the right of establishment in the Treaty.  
In OECD (2012, pp. 38-39), it is shown that the degree of restrictiveness in professional 
services in the EU-15 is (in 2008) at the lower end of the medium-level and clearly higher 
than in Japan; the difference with the US is even greater. With the help of a heterogeneity 
index (see section 7), it is shown that the (intra-)EU heterogeneity in professional services is 
about the same as the OECD average, but – quite remarkably – that the heterogeneity between 
non-EU OECD countries is about half (!) that of the intra-EU one. Of course, the latter group 
is not engaged in any particular economic integration or regulatory rapprochement 
whatsoever. This exercise only concerns four professions: lawyers, engineers, accountants 
and architects. These data serve as a powerful rationale for a mutual evaluation between 
member states of the regulated professions, as proposed in December 2011 by the 
Commission (see above). It is not proof of overregulation of too much restrictiveness per se, 
but it indicates that every member state ought to justify why this restrictive regulation is 
proportional and cannot be reduced, even if a number of OECD countries can do with far less 
restrictive regimes. 
CSES (2012) has undertaken a ‘regulatory mapping’ of whether and how 13 EU 
member states reserve tasks by regulation, exclusively or in a shared fashion, for specific 
professions. The study covered business services (including the liberal professions), 
construction and tourism. The disparities in the EU are striking. In these three sectors, 
Germany has 55 regulated professions whereas Finland only has 16. The total for the 13 EU 
countries is 481 reserves, 284 shared and 197 exclusive. Differences in regulatory approaches 
are considerable. There can be no doubt that such restrictions, more often than not, constitute 
formidable barriers to cross-border services provision in the EU. Recent empirical economic 
work by Paterson et al. (2012) and Paterson & Sellner (2012) substantiates that both the 
restrictiveness of professional regulation and the (internal) market foreclosure effect are likely 
to have adverse economic consequences, both directly and via (cost-raising) interlinkages 
with other services or manufacturing activities. With the help of an Overall Services 
Assessment Index, an indicator of four quality aspects (choice, quality, speed and certainty), it 
is found that EU countries with a high degree of restrictiveness tend to enjoy less rather than 
more quality in professional services. The implication is clear: there is considerable scope to 
reduce restrictiveness of professional regulation in the internal market, thereby lowering 
barriers and facilitating intra-EU market access, without harming quality and consumer 
aspects justifying regulation the first place.  
5.5  Barriers in other regulated services in the internal market 
The remaining regulated services for Figure 1 are a small group of sensitive sectors (health 
services to mobile patients, gambling and private security services) and temporary service 
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5.5.1  Three derogated, sensitive services 
These three services have in common that they were ‘taken out’ of the Bolkestein draft and, 
hence, are derogations in the horizontal services Directive 2006/123.
60 The following account 
of lingering barriers is merely indicative. First, the health services provided to patients 
moving cross-border to receive such services are a special case, in the sense that the core issue 
here is not ‘barriers’ in the form of restrictions of supply or establishment as such, but 
barriers for consumers to enjoy the rights under the Treaty (in other words, to exploit mode 2 
in GATS terms). The main issues are i) precise and timely information (by insurers or the 
state health service) to patients about what the payment ceilings would be for treatment 
abroad, so that patients can take informed decisions and do not get caught in legal battles on 
(say) considerable sums for operations which, later, appear to be not covered; ii) rules about 
those ceilings for reimbursement (CJEU case law is clear on this: what would be paid at home 
cannot normally be refused when being treated abroad); iii) the kind of treatments covered 
ought to correspond to the type of treatments covered under the schemes of the patient’s home 
country. Law-makers, especially in the European Parliament, were of the view, rightly or 
wrongly, that CJEU case law plus the specific protection under EU laws dealing with medical 
treatment related to intra-EU migrant workers 
61 was insufficient to give mobile patients the 
legal protection to ensure their rights.  
After years of debate, a separate Directive 2011/24/EU of 9 March 2011
62 has been 
enacted that addresses these issues and adds assurance about safety and quality of cross-
border healthcare as well as a system of formal cooperation between national health systems. 
It is complementary to cross-border healthcare rights for migrant workers. What ‘barriers’ 
would remain, now that this directive is in force, can only be due to differences in coverage 
between national health services and their insurance systems, but these are clearly a matter of 
national decision-making,
63 given widely diverging preferences, distinct views on 
private/public delivery combinations as well as reimbursement systems and entitlements.  
To give some idea of the economic dimension, around 1% of healthcare spending of EU 
countries relates to cross-border provision of services, some €10 billion, but that is without 
this new Directive. Depending on detailed options, the impact assessment of the original 
proposal
64 suggests a range for the number of patients benefitting annually from this Directive 
from 195,000 extra patients crossing intra-EU borders up to 780,000. Most of these are 
                                                 
60 In fact, temporary work agencies were also taken out of the horizontal services Directive during the legislative 
process. Between the EU member states, there are considerable differences in the use of temporary agency work 
and in the legal situation, status and working conditions of temporary agency workers within the EU. In turn, this 
has led to barriers or even a ban on the right of establishment of such agencies, most notably the long blockage 
of Randstad (the largest EU service provider in this submarket) coming into Italy. Therefore, the sensitivity in 
this area is mainly, if not entirely, due to a lack of harmonisation of minimum (temporary agency) workers’ 
rights. With the origin principle at first still in the draft (Bolkestein) Directive, it was impossible for social 
partners and many member states to accept these services to be governed by the horizontal services Directive. 
With Directive 2008/104/EC of 19 November 2008 on temporary agency work, the protection of such workers is 
ensured and the principle of equal treatment is explicitly guaranteed.  
61 Reg. 883/2004 in OJEC 2004 L 166 on the coordination of social security systems for migrant workers and 
their families. 
62 See OJEU L 88 (pp. 45 ff) of 4 April 2011 on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare.  
63 The Treaty even specifies that any Union action “shall complement national policies” (Art. 168 /1, TFEU) and 
“respect the responsibilities of the Member States for the definition of their health policy and for the organization 
and delivery of health services and medical care” (TFEU, Art. 168/7).  
64 See SEC (2008) 2163 of 2 July 2008, p. 63 for a summary. ACCESS BARRIERS TO SERVICES MARKETS | 49 
 
patients in border regions and those on waiting lists in national health systems suffering from 
rationing. We shall refrain from discussing a broader discussion of ‘barriers’ here.
65 
The second derogation from the services Directive concerns gambling. Member states 
tend to regulate this sector strictly, although somewhat less so for sports betting. Until 
recently, two regulatory models co-existed amongst member states: either licensed 
monopolies (often state-owned or partially) or several licensed operators under a strict 
regulatory regime. The first regime forms a denial of free movement of services as well as the 
right of establishment. Barriers are prohibitive. It has been allowed (under precise conditions) 
by the CJEU (e.g. in a case against Finland) as a SGEI, a service of general economic interest 
under Art. 106, TFEU, a construction usually applied to network industries. The second 
regime in principle allows for free (in fact, highly conditional) movement of services and for 
the (again, highly conditional) right of establishment and should be non-discriminatory even 
if strict.  
There are two problems with national gambling regulation, the first being that member 
states are inconsistent and employ incoherent laws. Thus, country A might defend its 
monopoly on gambling and games of chance, asserting that it wants to minimise addiction 
problems and pre-empt crime. In reality, if few or no more specific measures are taken, all the 
monopoly does is throw up a prohibitive barrier to entrants, whether domestic or from the EU, 
hence protecting a commercial interest or, if the state has a major financial stake, giving 
priority to maximum revenue. Indeed, there have been instances where the monopoly was 
advertising quite aggressively in order to generate more revenue without any sign of prudence 
for the market failures at stake. In the second regulatory model, this is less easy to do, but 
there may still be such a restrictive practice in licensing that non-discrimination is doubtful, or 
that the public interest motive (rather than protection of vested interests) is dubious at best. 
The second problem with gambling regulation in the EU is the response to gambling on-
line, a rapidly growing market. Whereas the EU gambling market had a turnover in 2011 of 
€85 billion with an annual growth rate of 2.8%, the on-line gambling segment amounted to 
€9.3 billion with a high growth rate of 14.7%; in 2015, the expected revenues for on-line 
gambling will be €13 billion, some 14% of the overall gambling market.
66 Since on-line might 
mean anywhere in the EU (or beyond), it risks having the effect of undermining existing 
regulatory models in various ways. On-line can be a black market (outright illegal), a ‘grey’ 
market (licensed operators in member states A and B, offering on-line gambling services in 
member state C, without authorisation) and a ‘white’ (legal) market, which tends to be 
regulated. National responses to on-line gambling have been disparate and, at times, 
incoherent, leading to cases
67 against member states. Meanwhile, commercial operators and 
                                                 
65 This Directive, in combination with section 5.4 on professionals, begs the broader question of whether the 
market for health services itself is part of the internal market. Strictly legally, it is but in actual practice the CJEU 
is extremely reluctant to assess restrictions and their logic. Can health providers (hence, the supply side) provide 
services across borders and/or establish themselves ‘freely’ in order to provide local services? And if so, what 
about the ‘opaque’ funding regimes of the member states, which – by possibly hidden state aids – might distort 
this incipient internal market for health services? The short answer is that these questions are basically taboo, 
except in marginal and carefully limited instances. We shall therefore ignore the issues involved. But see a 
revealing paper by Hancher & Sauter (2010). 
66 Source: Commission Staff doc SWD (2012) 345 of 23 November 2012, “Online gambling in the internal 
market”. 
67 Examples include France in 2010, removing – after Commission proceedings – exclusive rights on horse-race 
betting and introducing a licensing system (also for cross-border) on-line sports betting, while maintaining strict 
controls on gaming. Or, consider the case of the Netherlands, which allowed the introduction of new, addictive 
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even monopolies (sometimes eager to extend their business in other EU countries) are in need 
of greater legal certainty given the wide variety of restrictions and the elusive on-line markets.  
And member states feel a need to define an EU framework regime within which 
national regulated markets can operate, without unduly restraining less risky activities, also 
not cross-border. The Commission published a Green Paper
68 as the basis for an extensive 
consultation. It is therefore not easy to describe exactly ‘the’ barriers to cross-border service 
provision and to establishment in gambling activities, except that an internal market for sports 
betting seems to emerge (also on-line) with considerable regulation. Beyond that, models still 
differ but might well be seen as in a state of flux due to pressure from the Commission and 
the CJEU with respect to coherence and due to on-line developments. In 2012, the 
Commission proposed an EU framework for on-line gambling, dealing with enhanced 
supervision, administrative cooperation, better enforcement, responsible advertising, 
protecting minors and fighting addiction, preventing fraud and money laundering as well as 
safeguarding the integrity of sports matches.
69  
The third derogation consists of private security services. The original suggestion that a 
separate directive would be proposed seems to have been given low priority, given that links 
with national ‘state authority’ differ between member states, which would render it difficult to 
come to a workable agreement.  
5.5.2  Temporary cross-border provision of services 
When studying Table 9 and the relevant lines in Annex 2 for services under Directive 
2006/123, one can get a good idea of how cross-border services are still restricted by 
‘barriers’. However, that need not fully coincide with the ‘barriers’ to temporary cross-border 
services provision, since for such services, a lighter regulatory regime may well apply. As far 
as we know, no survey or even incomplete list of restrictions of temporary cross-border 
services under the services Directive exists in the public domain. A second area to be 
inspected are the temporary cross-border services under the regulated services regimes in 
Figure 1 (or, even beyond that, in services that are under national regulatory autonomy such 
as health, [non-private] education and non-private media services). Thirdly, temporary cross-
border services can be sensitive in some sectors where wage disparities in Europe are sharp 
and nominal wages are critical for competitiveness. This can be relevant in construction and 
related services, horticulture, selected agriculture, food processing and the hotel, restaurant 
and pubs business. Directive 96/71 on posted workers protects workers on temporary cross-
border service assignments against wage competition by imposing minimum wages of the 
country where the service is performed (host-country control).
70 This is a restriction, indeed a 
‘barrier’, that may have significant economic impact in an internal market with large wage 
differentials.  
                                                                                                                                                          
games and intensive advertising, without any sign of taking measures against gambling addiction, whilst 
maintaining its monopoly, the revenues of which go entirely to the state. The Commission issued a ‘reasoned 
opinion’ in an infringement proceeding, which may lead to a CJEU case. See Commission Press releases 
IP/10/1597 and IP/08/330.  
68 COM (2011) 128 of 24 March 2011, Green Paper on on-line gambling in the internal market. 
69 COM (2012) 596 of 23 November 2012, Towards a comprehensive European framework for online gambling. 
70 Note that this host-country control also applies to intra-EU migrant workers. In other words, in order to 
prevent artificial substitution between intra-EU migration and temporary services, both are subjected to host-
country control, thereby also ensuring that national wage arrangements (or laws) are not undermined by labour 
exploiting the internal market via migration or temporary services at far lower wages or even labour costs.  ACCESS BARRIERS TO SERVICES MARKETS | 51 
 
The posted workers Directive 96/71 is meant to facilitate short-run service assignments 
across borders (provider moving across border to client, or mode 4 in GATS). There are 
several controversies around this Directive and some have to do with ‘barriers’, directly or 
indirectly. It is good to realise that 96/71 is not about the services themselves but about the 
labour content of the services and some administrative aspects.
71 By imposing local minimum 
wages in temporary service contracts also for providers coming from other EU countries, 
competition for such service contracts can be ‘on the merits’ (that is, quality, special 
expertise, experience, duration, etc.) and is not influenced by artificially low prices driven by 
lower-than-local wages. Typically, labour unions defend this approach because they insist 
that, on any particular work site, equal work should be paid equally, not unequally. The term 
‘equally’ is to be interpreted not literally as ‘identical’, but pay has to obey local minimum 
wages in any event.  
In an internal market where (minimum) wages do not differ very much, the economic 
impact of the directive is almost certainly pro-competitive: on the merits. However, once the 
Union is characterised by a divide in low-wage and high-wage national economies (at least 
for a period before slow convergence reduces this divide sufficiently), the posted worker 
Directive has radically different economic effects. Since we analyse temporary service 
provision, normally one should expect a proximity constraint (as otherwise the travel costs 
and complications for short stays would render the provider uncompetitive). Therefore, 
imagine Latvian providers offering temporary services in Sweden or Finland, Slovak 
providers in Austria, Polish providers in Germany or Bulgarian providers in Greece. All these 
providers will be able to offer far lower prices for a given quality of service, given their local 
wages, if… they were allowed to do this. The Directive, however, forbids this: wages 
incorporated in the service must be at least the minimum wages in the host countries.  
The economic effect of this is that the incipient demand for a given quality of any 
temporary service offered by providers from low-wage economies is drastically curtailed. 
This is anti-competitive. It is socially problematic, too. Whereas it does protect local workers 
in Sweden, Finland, Austria, Germany or Greece, it pre-empts Eastern European EU workers 
from exploiting their lower wages as a competitive advantage in the internal market! In fact, 
one can regard this constraint as a serious impediment of the free movement of temporary 
services, because, with equal (minimum) wages, the advantages of local firms in performing 
temporary contracts may squeeze the Eastern providers out of the market for the large 
majority of cases. Put differently, in a purely economic perspective, the posted workers from 
the Eastern EU run into a high ‘barrier’, which prevents them from exploiting the internal 
services market. 
This economic conclusion has to be modified to some degree due to two particularities 
of actual practices in services markets. First, given the large wage differentials, the incentives 
for purchasers of services or for supplier companies to search for circumventive constructions 
are strong. The main evasions include a) local contractors winning the tender and 
subcontracting to companies originating in Eastern Europe; b) contracting an independent 
(without personnel) who, under the treaty, is free to move or establish and will contract one 
entire ‘service’ with one final price (irrespective of the implicit wage incorporated in the 
work); and c) since b) is not possible for a more sizeable assignment, an ‘alliance’ of a 
number of independents (without personnel) bids for the contract as a whole and the actual 
                                                 
71 The administrative aspects were causing severe barriers for temporary cross-border provision in some member 
states. See European Commission (2002) for evidence. The services Directive has several obligations to reduce 
unreasonable administrative requirements and enhance administrative cooperation between member states.  52 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
work is (legally) contracted on the basis of individual contracts. The current informal 
negotiations for a revision of 96/71 are likely to impose severe limits on the terms of 
subcontracting a). The options b) and c) run into natural limits but are nevertheless used 
frequently in the construction of smaller dwellings. Option b) is also applied in some other 
sectors although there seems to be no systemic information. Insofar as a, b and c are used, 
wage competition in certain highly specific sub-markets might still occur via (temporary) 
service contracts, some of which may well be cross-border. Second, Directive 96/71 assumes 
minimum wages, but the fact is that four EU countries do not have a general system of setting 
minimum wages by law, or have only selected sectoral minimum wages or no minimum 
wages as a matter of principle.
72 These countries are: Sweden, Denmark, Germany and 
Cyprus. Lacking minimum wages, it is anything but clear whether collectively agreed wages 
must also be applied by entrants from other countries, such as under temporary service 
provision. In spectacular CJEU cases;
73 like Laval (2007) and Rueffert (2008), the Court has 
clarified that this is not necessary, as long as reasonable offers are made (e.g. in Laval). The 
CJEU has the unenviable task of balancing two fundamental principles: free movement and 
protecting the rights of workers, the Eastern workers benefiting from the first and the Swedish 
and German workers from the second. In Germany, some questionable practices have been 
reported in the food processing industry near Munich where Bulgarians seemed to have 
worked for wages below €5 an hour, a fraction of regular German wages, via short-term 
posting arranged by Bulgarian intermediaries.  
Data on temporary service provision across intra-EU borders is non-existent (as far as 
the authors know). But some indirect evidence is available
74 and helpful in grasping economic 
reality. Around 1 million workers are posted annually in other EU countries for a service 
provision of limited duration, often no more than a few weeks or several months. Figure 3 
shows data on the receiving countries (host countries). This graph clarifies that temporary 
service provision across borders is not primarily driven by the intra-EU wage gaps. 
Apart from Germany, eight EU countries, with the largest inflows of posted workers, all 
register more posted workers from EU-15 (high-wage economies) than from EU-12. Of the 
three countries (Cyprus having virtually no posting) without minimum wages, only Germany 
has more posted workers from EU-12 than from EU-15, whereas in Sweden it is about equal 
and in Denmark there are few posted workers from Eastern Europe. In Finland (having a 
minimum wage), most posted workers nevertheless come from EU-12. The source of Figure 3 
also provides data on the sending countries
75 and it appears that, of the 15 EU countries 
‘sending’ more than 10,000 posted workers across intra-EU borders annually, nine are from 
EU-15. Those nine countries send a total of 519,000 workers whereas the six EU-12 countries 
in this group ‘send’ 326,000 (dominated by Poland with 204,000). These ‘sending’ data 
confirm that temporary-service provision across borders is not a marginal activity, but a 
probably useful ‘lubricator’ of the internal market for services with pro-competitive effects. It 
is also clear that, even if an unknown share of these activities might be artificially boosted by 
wage gaps in the EU (especially in three countries and via evasive constructions), the bulk of 
                                                 
72 The idea behind this refusal – alien to most EU countries – is that social partners should be free to contract and 
the state should not meddle with this ‘right’. Other EU countries have minimum wages, without in any way 
limiting the freedom of contracting wages and secondary conditions beyond the minimum. 
73 See Case C-341-05 Laval un Partneri [2007] ECR I-11767, and Case C-346-06 Rueffert [2008] ECR I-1989. 
74 All data and the graph originate from European Commission (2011), “Employment and social developments in 
Europe 2011”, pp. 257-258. Note that these data are likely to be an underestimate.  
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temporary service provision across borders is driven by quality and ‘value-for-money’ 
considerations of purchasers with a large share of (high wage) EU-15 workers performing 
those services. What one cannot observe, of course, is the converse: How much of such 
temporary cross-border service provision has remained impossible due to the host-country-
control principle and/or cumbersome administrative requirements? 
Figure 3. Posted workers in host countries, coming from EU-12 and EU-15 (in thousands) 
 
Note: Data do not include E101 certificates issued for persons active in 2 or more MS, multiple destinations, or 
international transport. Figures do not include postings from SE and CH as neither country provided data 
disaggregated by destination country. Figures for the UK relate to the period April 2009 to March 2010, 
and the figures for Germany to 1 January 2009 to 30 November 2009. 
Sources: European Commission (2011), “Employment and Social Developments in Europe”. 
 
6.  Measuring Service Trade Restrictiveness: Comparing indices 
6.1  The Services Trade Restrictiveness Indices (STRIs) 
The mere description of barriers to cross-border provision of services (in four modes) is a 
complex exercise, let alone their quantification for purposes of economic analysis or policy 
information. This section briefly compares some quantification efforts of services barriers, 
with details in Table 11. Although there have been attempts to construct ‘tariff equivalents’ of 
restrictive measures based on partial equilibrium analysis (see Deardorff & Stern, 2008; Dihel 
& Shepherd, 2007), most economists are uncomfortable with those because they do not do 
justice to the nature and practical effects of most of these behind-the-border measures.
76 
Following some simple, but illustrative attempts by Hoekman (1995), the Australian 
Productivity Commission pioneered services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) around 
                                                 
76 As pointed out by Francois & Hoekman (2010), a different way to look at regulatory restrictions in trade in 
services is based on an indirect method to calculate the flows that we would observe without such restrictions, 
and derive an estimation of tariff-equivalents this way. However, this approach is hampered by difficulties in 
establishing price-cost margins or differences in volumes according to different policies. This is one of the main 
reasons why the earlier literature preferred frequency indicators. Note, too, that tariff equivalents are by 
definition unsuitable when barriers represent fixed-costs-of-market access, because such fixed costs have no 
effect on the pricing of the services following actual entry into the market.  54 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
2000. This work has been further developed notably by Philippa Dee and Christopher 
Findlay. At a later stage, the OECD and the World Bank each have begun developing more 
systematic data bases, and two distinct STRIs. All these efforts targeting cross-border service 
provision anywhere in the world economy.  
The restrictiveness index provides a frequency indicator capable of assessing the impact 
of policy restrictions on the exchange of services. The idea behind it is to convert qualitative 
information of ‘barriers’ into a quantitative indicator that, depending on the specific 
methodology applied, approximates the degree of restrictiveness (see Table 11). The aim of 
this difficult exercise is two-fold: first, the index can be used as a regressor to evaluate the 
impact of service restrictions, for instance, on services trade or FDI (Francois & Hoekman, 
2010). Moreover, it is likely to serve policy-makers as it synthesises complex information 
which makes it possible to compare regulatory restrictiveness of two or more 
sectors/countries, as well as over time. In the world economy at large, this may already be 
helpful for negotiators in free trade area agreements or at WTO/GATS level. However, inside 
the EU’s internal market, with overriding and enforceable principles which already do away 
with most of the restrictions caught by such crude empirical measures, one has to zoom in on 
the numerous subtleties characterising many services barriers. 
One of the early attempts was made by Dee (2005). By applying the methodology 
followed by Findlay & Warren (2000) to quantify barriers to trade in service, she computed 
an indicator based on a quantitative assessment of qualitative restrictions and then weighted 
the results thanks to experts’ judgments. It constructs two separate indicators capable of 
differentiating between the impact of restrictions on domestic incumbents and foreign 
entrants.  
In 2009, a new index was developed by the OECD capable of measuring the degree of 
restrictiveness of cross-border trade in services, the Services Trade Restrictiveness Index. The 
aim of these new sets of indicators is to empirically and more systematically assess how 
regulatory restrictions create obstacles to cross-border exchange of services in many 
countries. Irrespective of whether regulations applied by (OECD) members are justified, the 
focus is on whether and to what extent they create an obstacle to trade or FDI. The current 
OECD pilot project
77 focuses on few sectors only, namely i) construction, ii) computer 
services, iii) professional services, iv) telecommunications, postal and courier services and v) 
distribution and audio-visual services. The authors
78 construct an index by studying five types 
of restrictions
79 that can affect not only service provision in general but also the respective 
modes of supply and turning them into a quantitative binary measure. The data requirements 
are of course massive. Methodologically, the aim of the project is to provide an indicator that 
make things as simple as possible but not simpler! (OECD, Project team, 2009).  
 
                                                 
77 For more info, please see the OECD website (http://www.oecd.org/tad/services-trade/ 
towardsaservicestraderestrictivenessindexstri.htm). 
78 Among the team responsible for the OECD STRI project, we mention: Massimo Geloso Grosso. Frederic 
Gonzales, Anna Jankowska, Rainer Lanz, Molly Lesher, Sebastien Miroudot, Hidelgunn K. Nordas and 
Alexandros Ragoussis.  
79 The five types of restriction under analysis are namely: restrictions on foreign ownership and other market 
entry conditions, restrictions of the movement of people, other discriminatory measures and international 
standards, barriers to competition, and finally regulatory transparency and administrative requirements. ACCESS BARRIERS TO SERVICES MARKETS | 55 
 
Table 11. Restrictiveness indicators for services and heterogeneity: A comparison 
Index Definition  Countries/sectors/modes of 
supply  
Trade restricting 







It is a composite 
index aimed at 
identifying any 
trade restricting 
regulation in the 
services sector. It 
can be derived 
from a bottom-up 
approach starting 






In the pilot phase of the project, 
seven sectors are covered: 
computer services, 
construction, professional 
services (including accounting, 
architectural services, 
engineering services and legal 
service), telecommunications, 
postal and courier services, 
distribution and audio-visual 
services. 
 




are collected according 
to the following types of 
restrictions: 
•  Restrictions on foreign 
ownership and other 
market entry 
conditions 
•  Restrictions on the 
movement of people 
•  Discriminatory 
measures, standards 
and equivalence 
•  Public ownership, size 
and scope of public 
enterprises 
•  Price controls and 
regulations on market 
behaviour 
•  Barriers to 
competition 




Binary (90%) and 
continuous scoring 
1. Expert judgment (new 
approach compared to 
the past that reduces the 
risk of subjectivity) 
2. Principal component 
analysis  
3. Marginal effect on 
trade 
 
However, final decision 
imposed equal weights 
for measures within 
categories 
The robustness checks 
(performed through 
PCA, equal and 
random weights) 
states that the STRIs 
are robust. 
Furthermore, a gravity 
equation confirms 
that: 
Modes of supply are 
complementary 
(Nordäs & Kox, 2008) 
so they can be 
affected by restrictive 
policies as much as 
the trade flows ‘level 
in each mode.  
In professional 
service, telecoms and 
computer services, 
regression supports 
the validity of STRIs 







It is a measure 
that captures the 
restrictive effect 
of the entire set 
of policies 
applied by a 
country in a 
given service 
sector and mode 
of supply. 
103 countries (79 developing 
and 24 OECD countries) 
 
Five sectors: 
•  financial services (bank 
lending and deposit 
acceptance) 
•  telecommunications (fixed 
and mobile line) 
•  retail distribution 
•  transportation (air 




auxiliary services, road 
trucking and railway freight) 
•  professional services 
(accounting auditing and 
legal). 
Above-mentioned sectors are 
further divided into subsectors. 
Data concern only Modes 1, 3 
and 4. 
Information provided on 
the basis of the Services 
Trade Restrictions 
database. 
Among the measures 
pertaining to Mode 3: 
i. Requirements on the 
legal form of entry and 
restrictions on foreign 
equity 
ii. Limits on licenses and 
discrimination in the 
allocation of licenses; 
iii. Restrictions on 
ongoing operations; 




mode 1 are slightly 
different in that they 
typically stipulate 
conditions under which 
cross-border trade may 
take place.  
Among the measures 
concerning Mode 4, the 
database covers only 
professional services 
focusing on immigration 
rules and qualification 
requirements that 
strongly affect this 
mode. 
The authors assess 
policy regimes in 
their entirety and 
assign them to five 
degrees of 
restrictiveness: 
•  completely open, 
i.e. no restrictions 
at all; 
•  completely closed, 
i.e. no entry 
allowed at all; 
•  virtually open but 
with minor 
restrictions; 
•  virtually closed 
but with very 
limited 
opportunities to 
enter and operate; 
and a final 
residual 
•  middle category 
of regimes which 




are neither trivial 
nor stringent. 
The methodology 
implies a value 
assigned to each 
regime on an scale 
from 0 to 100 with 
intervals of 25. 
Different weights are 
attached to each sector 
based on services 
sectors’ standardised 
share in total services 
output for an average 
industrialised country.  
According to their 
estimations, 
restrictions can reduce 
the expected value of 
sectoral foreign 
investment by $2.2 
billion in a period of 7 
years. Additionally, 




STRI of mode 3 and 
the Investing across 
Border’s Ease of 
Establishment index. 
This suggests that 
across countries a 
more liberal services 
trade policy stance is 
associated with a 
greater ease of 
establishment. 
Finally, the high 
positive correlation 
observed between the 
country-level overall 
STRI score and the 
OECD‘s PMR index 
(both increasing in 
restrictiveness).  






The aim is 
identifying the 
implementation 





(at sector and 
country level). 





of services and 
FDI. Another one 
affects domestic 
activity 
27 member states 
 
15 selected sectors (affected by 
the SD). In particular: 
accountants, architects, 
certification service in the area 
of construction, 
construction/building company, 
crafts businesses in 
construction sector, engineers, 
hotels, large retail, legal 
services, real estate agents, 
restaurants, small retail shops, 
tax advisers, tourist guides, 
travel agency 
 




1) Article 9 
authorisations 
 
2) Article 14 
requirements 
3) Article 15 
requirements 
 
4) Article 16 
requirements 
 
5) Article 25 
requirements 
 
The indicator is a 




numbers before and 
after the Directive. 
In particular, equal 
to 1 (existing barrier) 
and 0 (non existent), 
before; 1 (fully 
maintained barrier), 
0 (non-existent 
barrier) and 0.8 
(reduced) 
Equal weights to the 
restrictions at country-
sector level mean 
Econometric analysis 
only based on the pre-
directive period. The 
impact of the barriers 
on trade, FDI 
(international channel) 
and direct impact 
(domestic channel) is 
defined in terms of 
productivity. The 
estimated elasticities 
of trade to cross-
border provision 
barriers in the 
importing country and 
of FDI to 
establishment barriers 
in the destination 
country show that a 
removal of barriers 
increases trade and 













these takes place. 




any pair of 
countries. What 
matters for the 
42 importing countries  
(OECD members) and 60 
partner (OECD plus other) 
 
Sectors in trade come from 
EBOPS categories and FDI 
stocks from the ISIC 
classification. In particular, the 
analysis covers transport, post 
and telecommunications, 
financial services, computer 
and related services and other 
business services. 
 
Bilateral indicators of 
policy heterogeneity 
consider restrictive 
policies listed in the 
OECD PMR survey and 
the WB Cost of Doing 
Business indicator 
 
The regulatory areas 
included in the PMR 
database consider: 
barriers to competition; 
administrative barriers 
for start-ups; regulatory 
and 
The dissimilarity 
indicator Rhij is 
specific for each 
possible country pair 
i and j and ranges 
from 1 (both 
countries are 
dissimilar with 
respect to R), to 0 (in 
the opposite case).  
  With indicator built 
on PMR Database, 
bilateral FDI 
decreases when eh 
bilateral heterogeneity 
index, in the form of 
aggregate PMR and 
sub-indicators, 
increases. The use of 
dummy variables, 
however, shows that 
when an EU member 
state trades with an 
extra-EU country, 
there is a beneficial 58 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
exporting 
company is to 
know to what 
degree rules in 
the target country 
are dissimilar to 
rules in the firm’s 
home country. 
There is no index grouped by 
modes of supply  
administrative opacity; 
explicit barriers to trade 
and investment; and 
state control 
 
The WB Cost of Doing 
Business include: 
Starting a Business, 





Paying Taxes, Trading 
Across Borders, 
Enforcing Contracts, 
and Closing a Business. 
effect due to a 
potential 
harmonisation (or 
mutual recognition) of 
the regulatory 
frameworks: this 
means that countries 
characterised by a 
higher level of 
heterogeneity can gain 
more by this policy 
option than countries 
already liberalised, 
and can experience, in 
any case, an increase 
in the inward stocks. 
The same result is 
confirmed by the use 

















The index of 
barriers to 
foreign entry 




World economies in one or two 




No modes of supply 
Restrictions on 
commercial presence: 
•  Licensing 
•  Direct Investment 
•  No new licenses and 
JV arrangements 
•  Movement of People 
•  Permanent 
 
Other restrictions such 
as Raising and lending 
funds by banks 
 
Information originally 
compiled by McGuire 
and Schuele (2000)  
A score is assigned 
to each restriction 
from 0 to 1 with 
intervals of 0.25 and 
then aggregated by 
country  
The weighted scheme is 
arbitrary by assigning a 
weight (empirically 
tested) to each 
restriction. It can be 
distinguished between a 
foreign and domestic 
weighting scheme. The 
study recalls the weight 
proposed by McGuire 
& Schuele (2000). 
In Dee (2004) and 





of a ‘corrected’ 










measure of the 




Sources: Authors’ elaboration on information from OECD (2009), World Bank (2012), European Commission (2012), Kox et al. (2009) and Dee (2004).60 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
Therefore, one would want to avoid losing crucial qualitative data once they are 
aggregated in a simple number: it implies preserving as much as possible the variations in the 
raw information in the final indicator. Once the basic regulatory restrictions are measured, the 
definition of a threshold for the binary measure, when it is not naturally provided, is 
supported by a proper weighting scheme, usually an expert’s judgment, hoping to limit 
subjectivity as much as possible.
80 
The index is used in explaining trade variables with the help of three gravity 
regressions, using as dependent variables bilateral imports, bilateral inward FDI and bilateral 
inward FATS
81 in four services sectors: construction, computer and related services, 
professional services and telecoms, from 1999 to 2006. The coefficients are interpreted as 
importer-specific and correlated to bilateral exchange over time. The negative value indicates 
that a higher STRI is related to lower bilateral trade in services. Notwithstanding the 
problems in data collection (and the temporal mismatch between trade and regulation data), 
results are satisfactory for telecoms and professional services where the index shows 
significant negative coefficients. In computer services, a significant negative coefficient is 
estimated for inward FATS and FDI. More ambiguous results are instead shown for the 
construction sector.  
A slightly different approach is proposed by the World Bank based on the Service 
Trade Restriction Database,
82 which collects data for 103 countries and three modes of 
service supply (excluding mode 2 – consumption abroad). The database provides 
complementary information by specifying restrictions that only affect foreign providers. It 
also adds value by covering a large group of countries.  
Table 12. World Bank regulatory database by subjects and providers 
Subject  Affecting foreign providers  Affecting ALL providers 
Policy or regulation  Services Trade Restrictions 
Database 
OECD product market 
regulation (PMR) 
Administrative or procedural 
requirements 
WB/IFC Investing Across 
Borders 
WB Cost of Doing Business 
OECD Product Market 
Regulation (PMR) 
Source: Borchert, Gootiiz and Mattoo (2012). 
The index is based on a simple average by country and by sectors and, in contrast to 
other indicators, rather than assigning weights to different policy regimes, it considers 
measures as additive. The methodology is the following: for each (sub) sector and mode of 
supply, a value from zero to 100 (degree of restrictiveness) is assigned, with intervals of 25. 
                                                 
80 The authors are aware of the pitfalls of such a methodology. What should actually be used to properly weight 
each sector and type of restriction is very difficult to calculate. It is argued that a perfect scheme would be 
characterised by a weight able to measure the marginal contribution to trade costs of each sector according to 
the respective types of restrictions. However, as this is hard to define especially due to the lack of consistent 
(and timely) data, weights are based on expert judgment while other schemes – such as Principal Component 
Analysis and equal and random weights – are used to perform robustness checks. The subjectivity issue when 
weights are solely based on experts’ judgments, is quite controversial and, at the same time, difficult to avoid. 
However, the OECD STRI tries to reduce this risk by asking experts to agree on categories’ rankings and scores 
within each category. 
81 The service turnover of foreign affiliates in their host countries (foreign affiliates’ trade in services). 
82 Please see database on the World Bank website (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/services-trade-
restrictions). ACCESS BARRIERS TO SERVICES MARKETS | 61 
 
The resulting five degrees of restrictiveness are: completely open, completely closed, 
virtually open but with minor restrictions, virtually closed but with limited opportunities to 
enter the market and a residual category where the regulation under analysis is not 
preventing entry but imposes obstacles at later stages. The scores attached to the different 
areas can then be aggregated across sectors and modes, using sector weights defined by the 
authors (inevitably somewhat subjective). As shown by previous attempts, pitfalls in 
methodologies are such that researchers prefer to keep weighting schemes as simple as 
possible, and strongly supported by expert judgment, rather than building a more complicated 
approach that is difficult to defend. Recognising the broad country coverage and the 
undisputed merit to define an indicator on service trade restricting regulations by modes of 
supply, it is nevertheless worth oberving that it would seem to be more useful to rank 
restrictiveness in various regions in the world economy, rather than exploring intra-OECD 
differences (which have become smaller), let alone, the more subtle and refined intra-EU 
barriers to exchange of services. The latter would require a more refined approach as we 
showed for intra-EU services above. In an international comparison (with a limited sector 
scope), it is not surprisingly that OECD countries tend to show a relatively low level of 
restrictiveness in transportation services and in services provided under mode 4, although 
these are the most protected sectors in the world overall (see Borchert et al., 2012). 
6.2  An EU barrier indicator quantifying barrier removal under the services 
Directive 
Recently, the European Commission (Monteagudo et al., 2012) also embarked on a brave 
exercise of quantifying the restrictiveness of services regulations. In this case, however, the 
focus is on the quantification of the change in barriers before and after the implementation of 
the services Directive. A barrier indicator is built from data derived from the ‘mutual 
evaluation’ process and supported by experts’ analysis. The authors study changes in 20 types 
of regulatory restrictions falling under the scope of the Directive.  
The restrictions analysed include both those affecting cross-border provision of services 
between member states and those regarding the establishment of commercial presence in 
other member states. The construction of the barrier indicator is functional to test two 
channels through which the Directive, once having removed or reduced intra-EU services 
trade barriers, contributes to an increase of productivity: first, by facilitating trade and FDI 
and, second, by exposing domestic service activities to greater competition from the better 
functioning of the internal market. Of course, the sector scope is limited to services falling 
under the Directive. As in STRIs, the main challenge is to turn qualitative information from 
the ‘mutual evaluation’ into quantitative indicators without losing information included in 
raw data. The methodology used by Monteagudo et al. (2012) partially avoids this issue 
since, instead of translating the restrictions, they assess quantitatively how this is changed 
thanks to the Directive. More precisely, they assess each restriction before and after the 
implementation with a 0 (non-existent barrier) or 1 (existing) and as a 0 (non-existent), 1 
(still existent) and 0.8 (partially reduced),
83 respectively. Then, a mean by sectors and 
country is computed by assigning equal weights.  
Their results in Figures 4a and 4b show a marked reduction of restrictive regulation in 
the EU, but it is uneven between member states both in cross-border exchange and in FDI 
(establishment).  
                                                 
83 The value 0.8 corresponds to a reduction in restrictions of 20%. A group of experts agreed on this assumption. 62 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
The Commission reports that no less than 35,000 requirements for services in 27 EU 
countries have been identified and reviewed during screening and evaluation, resulting in 
considerable simplification, less restrictiveness and abolition in many instances. In effect, the 
services Directive and the ‘ownership’ assumed by the member states in the process of 
implementation has, belatedly, led to a thorough enforcement of the EU treaty principles and 
case law about the internal services market that had been lacking for decades.  
 
Figure 4. Average barrier changes under the services Directive by 2011 
(a) (b) 
 
Note: The percentage change shows how each member state has reduced barriers to cross-border exchange (a) 
and establishment (b) after the implementation of the Directive, regardless of their initial condition.  
Source: Monteagudo et al. (2012). 
Monteagudo et al. (2012) find, when using the barrier indicator in a gravity model, that 
the implementation of the services Directive has generated an extra 0.8% of EU GDP 
(ranging from 0.3% and 1.5%, depending on the member state in question). The main merit 
of this study is to identify two channels through which the increase takes place: the 
international one by boosting intra-EU services trade by 7% and FDI in services by 4% and, 
secondly, by inducing an increase of domestic productivity prompted by the domestic reform 
process implied by a lower restrictiveness of services regulation.  
6.3  A complementary approach: The CPB Bilateral Heterogeneity Index 
A somewhat different indicator to restrictiveness in trade in services can be built, based on 
the idea that regulatory heterogeneity between (EU) countries acts as an additional obstacle to 
the exchange of services. Regulatory heterogeneity is purely about differences; it neither 
refers to the intensity of the regulation in the national market (at least, not directly) nor does it 
assume that regulatory measures per se always restrict competition. After all, when properly 
designed, (services) regulations are a remedy for market failures and such proper remedies 
could sometimes even contribute to lowering entry costs. The idea behind such heterogeneity 
relates to the extra difficulties companies face when planning strategies to exploit the EU 
internal market for services. If services regulation is ‘justified’ according to EU principles 
(mainly, against market failures and non-discrimination), there is no need or obligation to 
remove it, but it may still cause regulatory heterogeneity between any two EU countries. The 
reason is a lack of harmonisation, alignment of regulations or mutual recognition. Unlike in 
the case of tariffs and tariff equivalents in goods, (non-price) regulatory measures do not ACCESS BARRIERS TO SERVICES MARKETS | 63 
 
affect the export price of the service provided abroad, since they only alter the fixed costs of 
entry.
84 The consequent increase in fixed costs implies a higher volume for the single firm 
before reaching the break-even point, hence for the decision to enter the market. Kox et al. 
(2007) indeed, show that regulatory heterogeneity has a positive effect on the size of firms 
providing services across borders. It also follows that a second effect consists of fewer 
companies entering the market. Once the exporting firm enters the market, the regulatory 
heterogeneity with respect to the domestic one is no longer able to influence the activity of 
the foreign provider. In other words, insofar as trade barriers in services consist of regulatory 
heterogeneity, they cannot be proxied by tariff equivalents since the fixed costs of such 
barriers do not have any impact on the actual export price. In general equilibrium analysis, 
this distinction might well have a significant impact on the final evaluation of trade in 
services agreements. 
In Kox & Lejour (2005), the effect of regulatory heterogeneity on the structure of fixed 
costs is explained with the help of Figure 5. It shows the fixed costs which have to be 
incurred every time the individual firm wants to enter a new (national) market (in the EU), in 
case of regulatory heterogeneity, while in the case of mutual recognition the average costs 
tend to marginally decrease. The policy implication is straightforward. If the majority of 
services are provided by SMEs, the presence of regulatory heterogeneity acts as market-entry 
deterrence by increasing the volume of sales that must be attained in the new export market 
before the break-even point is reached. 
 
Figure 5. Cost effect of regulatory heterogeneity 
 
Source: Kox & Lejour (2005). 
 
                                                 
84 Fixed trade costs are mainly caused by regulatory barriers. In some instances, natural barriers such as 
differences in languages and (informal) institutions can play a role as well. 64 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
7.  Conclusions 
Answering a seemingly simple question about the nature and prevalence of barriers to cross-
border trade and investment in services has only recently become possible. In order to make 
the answer intelligible, one has to first appreciate the different characteristics of access 
barriers to services markets as compared to those hindering goods markets. Access barriers to 
services are mainly the consequence of domestic regulation (behind-the border). Much more 
difficult to read the economic impact than for tariffs or quotas, such regulatory barriers are 
complex, multivariate and extremely differentiated; they are often applicable in regulatory 
clusters, generating a cumulative effect which throttles effective access.  
When addressing barriers for services markets, there is a striking difference between 
the non-EU WTO environment and the EU (or EEA) internal market. In the former, the 
GATS has not been of great value in disciplining WTO partners, given the relatively few and 
shallow commitments in the negotiation schedules. Also, numerous recent FTAs do not often 
move beyond GATS commitments or beyond (modest) Doha offerings. Countless 
discriminatory regulatory barriers persist between non-EU WTO partners, something (by 
now) unthinkable in the EU. On the subtle, yet effective barriers arising from non-
discriminatory regulation, just a few non-EU WTO regimes are only beginning to consider 
them in earnest with only modest results in some bilaterals so far. In quantification efforts of 
services barriers in the GATS environment, more often than not, the focus is on 
discriminatory measures.  
The EU internal market for services is radically more liberal, due to (the right of) free 
movement between and establishment in all EU member states, as well as the application of a 
tough EU competition policy. Moreover, in broad sectors that are relatively heavily regulated 
(such as financial markets, network industries, etc.), EU regulation has greatly facilitated far-
reaching liberalisation and later deep market integration. Finally, mutual recognition has also 
facilitated cross-border flows or aspects of intra-EU FDI. Given the complicated and 
splintered EU case law on services barriers and the highly imperfect enforcement up to the 
end of the 1990s, the relatively lightly regulated services sectors were brought under the 2006 
horizontal services Directive. This study provides a quantitative assessment of barrier 
removal due to the Directive as well as a detailed exposition of remaining barriers to services 
market, both for trade and FDI, complemented by some sectoral details as well. The data give 
rise to two conclusions: 
i)  Unlike what was expected after a three-year battle in the European Parliament at the 
end of 2006, many barriers have been either abolished or reduced, and black-listed 
protectionist practices have disappeared. 
ii)  There are nevertheless many barriers remaining, especially with impact on FDI.  
The six (regulated) services regimes outside the horizontal services Directive have seen 
considerable progress in liberalising market access in the period since 1992, whether in 
network industries, financial services, transport or professional services. There has also been 
some improvement (less red tape and arbitrariness) in the regime for temporary cross-border 
services. Nevertheless, none of these regulatory regimes has led to a genuine internal market, 
although transport (other than freight rail) has come close. The nature of the remaining 
obstacles is sketched for all these regimes. Removing these barriers may imply regulatory 
reforms at both EU and member state levels in one instance (e.g. freight rail), enormous 
infrastructural investment in another (e.g. electricity, gas and rail), less-intrusive regulation 
and more mutual recognition (e.g. certain professions), highly specific EU regulation (e.g. ACCESS BARRIERS TO SERVICES MARKETS | 65 
 
private security services, temporary services across borders) or ingenious combinations of 
some of these. 
Finally, the quantification of market access barriers in services is slowly making 
progress. After early attempts to ‘guesstimate’ different degrees of restrictiveness of services, 
databases of the OECD and the World Bank have drastically improved. The services trade 
restrictiveness index (STRI) of the OECD and that of the World Bank differ in the 
methodology (e.g. the latter is additive) of measuring services barriers, which is welcome, 
offering alternatives in the presence of great complexity. However, our paper shows – with 
very detailed examples from the non-EU WTO environment and on the basis of inspection of 
disaggregated services barriers inside the EU internal market – that STRIs have considerable 
limitations. They cannot possibly reflect the many subtleties of non-discriminatory service 
barriers and are handicapped when it comes to the accumulation of subtle barriers over 
different stages of the value chain. 
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A.  Commercial presence (mode 3) - restrictions on entry             
1  Are there policy restrictions to new entry (via commercial 
establishment)? 
            
              
 A n y   f i r m ?               
  International air passenger transport (scheduled  services)  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  International air passenger (non-scheduled  charter  services)  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  International air freight (all-cargo carriers, express delivery)  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0
  Domestic air transport (scheduled  services)  na 0 0 1 0 0 0 na 0 0 0.1
  Domestic air transport   (non-scheduled charter services)  na 0 0 1 0  0 0 na  0 0 0.1
  Domestic air freight (all-cargo carriers, express delivery)  na 0 0 1 0  0 0 na  0 0 0.1
  Provision of fuel  1 1 na 1 0  1 0 0  0 0 0.4
  Luggage and freight loading and unloading  0 0 0 1 0  1 0 1  0 0 0.3
  Aircraft repair and maintenance  0 0 0 1 0  0 0 1  0 0 0.2
  Selling and marketing of air transport services  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0
  Computer reservation system  1 0 0 0 0  1 0 0  0 0 0.2
 Foreign  firms?              
  International air passenger transport (scheduled  services)  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.1
  International air passenger (non-scheduled  charter  services)  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.1
  International air freight (all-cargo carriers, express delivery)  0 0 0 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0.1
  Domestic air transport (scheduled  services)  na 0 0 1 1 0 0 na 0 1 0.4
  Domestic air transport   (non-scheduled charter services)  na 0 0 1 1  0 0 na  0 1 0.4
  Domestic air freight (all-cargo carriers, express delivery)  na 0 0 1 1  0 0 na  0 1 0.4
  Provision of fuel  1 1 na 1 0  1 0 0  0 1 0.6
  Luggage and freight loading and unloading  0 0 0 1 1  1 0 1  0 0 0.4
  Aircraft repair and maintenance  0 0 0 1 0  0 0 1  0 0 0.2
  Selling and marketing of air transport services  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0
  Computer reservation system  1 0 0 0 0  1 0 0  0 0 0.2
B.  Restrictions on cross-border trade (mode 1)             
3  Are there restrictions on cross-border supply by foreign service 
providers              
 in  non-scheduled  (charter)  market?              
  International air passenger (non-scheduled  charter  services)  0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.3
  Domestic air transport   (non-scheduled charter services)  na 0 1 0 1  0 1 na  0 0 0.4
5  Has the country ratified the ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on Air                      
  Services?  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.8
C.  Restrictions on the movt of intra-corporate transferees of foreign-             
invested companies (mode 4)             
7  Are there residency or nationality requirements or quotas for 
personnel 
            
              
  employed by locally established foreign airline companies?  1 1 1 1 1  0 1 0  1 1 0.8
8  Are there categories of intra-corporate transferees whose entry and 
stay is 
            
              
  subject to labour market tests?  1 0 1 0 1  1 0 0  0 0 0.4
D.   Ownership              
9  Is private ownership in the provision of services through 
commercial              
 establishment  allowed?              
 Existing  operators              
  International air passenger transport (scheduled  services)  0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0 0 0 0 1 0.5
  International air passenger (non-scheduled charter  services)  0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0 0 0 0 1 0.5
  International air freight (all-cargo carriers, express delivery)  0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8  0 0 0  0 1 0.5
  Domestic air transport (scheduled services)  na 0.8 0.8 1 0.8 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.4
  Domestic air transport   (non-scheduled charter services)  na 0.8 0.8 1 1  0 0 0  0 0.8 0.5
  Domestic air freight (all-cargo carriers, express delivery)  na 0.8 0.8 1 1  0 0 0  0 0.8 0.5
  Provision of fuel  0.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8  1 0 0  0 1 0.6
  Luggage and freight loading and unloading  0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8  0 0 0  0 0.8 0.5
  Aircraft repair and maintenance  0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0 0 0 0 1 0.5ACCESS BARRIERS TO SERVICES MARKETS | 71 
 






































































































  Selling and marketing of air transport services 0.8 0.8 0.8 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.4
  Computer reservation system  0.8 0.8 0.8 0 0.8 1 0 0 0 0.8 0.5
 N e w   e n t r a n t s               
  International air passenger transport (scheduled services)  0.8 0.8 0 0.8 0.8 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.4
  International air passenger (non-scheduled charter services)  0.8 0.8 0 0.8 0.8 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.4
  International air freight (all-cargo carriers, express delivery)  0.8 0.8 0 0.8 0.8 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.4
  Domestic air transport (scheduled services)  na 0.8 0 1 0.8 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.4
  Domestic air transport  (non-scheduled charter services)  na 0.8 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.4
  Domestic air freight (all-cargo carriers, express delivery)  na 0.8 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.4
  Provision of fuel  0.5 0.8 0 0.8 0.8 1 0 0 0 0.8 0.5
  Luggage and freight loading and unloading  0.8 0.8 0 0.8 0.8 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.4
  Aircraft repair and maintenance  0.8 0.8 0 0.8 0.8 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.4
  Selling and marketing of air transport services  0.8 0.8 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.3
  Computer reservation system  0.8 0.8 0 0 0.8 1 0 0 0 0.8 0.4
10     Is foreign ownership in the provision of services through 
commercial              
  Existing operators              
  International air passenger transport (scheduled services)  0.8 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 0 0.5 0.8 0.6
  International air passenger (non-scheduled charter services)  0.8 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.6 0 0.5 0.8 0.6
  International air freight (all-cargo carriers, express delivery) 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.6 0 0.5 0.8 0.6
  Domestic air transport (scheduled services) na 0.8 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.6 na 0.5 1 0.7
  Domestic air transport  (non-scheduled charter services)  na 0.8 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.6 na 0.5 1 0.7
  Domestic air freight (all-cargo carriers, express delivery)  na 0.8 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.6 na 0.5 1 0.7
  Provision of fuel  0.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.6 0 0.5 1 0.6
  Luggage and freight loading and unloading  0.8 0.8 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.6 0 0.5 0.8 0.6
  Aircraft repair and maintenance 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.6 0 0.5 0.5 0.6
  Selling and marketing of air transport services 0.8 0.8 0.5 0 0.5 0.8 0 0 0.5 0.8 0.5
  Computer reservation system  0.8 0.8 0.5 0 0.5 1 0 0 0.5 0.8 0.5
 N e w   e n t r a n t s               
  International air passenger transport (scheduled services)  0.8 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 0 0.5 0.8 0.6
  International air passenger (non-scheduled charter services)  0.8 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.6 0 0.5 0.8 0.6
  International air freight (all-cargo carriers, express delivery)  0.8 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.6 0 0.5 0.8 0.6
  Domestic air transport (scheduled services) na 0.8 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.6 na 0.5 1 0.7
  Domestic air transport  (non-scheduled charter services)  na 0.8 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.6 na 0.5 1 0.7
  Domestic air freight (all-cargo carriers, express delivery)  na 0.8 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.6 na 0.5 1 0.7
  Provision of fuel  0.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.6 0 0.5 1 0.6
  Luggage and freight loading and unloading  0.8 0.8 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.6 0 0.5 0.8 0.6
  Aircraft repair and maintenance 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.6 0 0.5 0.5 0.6
  Selling and marketing of air transport services 0.8 0.8 0.5 0 0.5 0.8 0 0 0.5 0.8 0.5
  Computer reservation system  0.8 0.8 0.5 0 0.5 1 0 0 0.5 0.8 0.5
11     Does the government have a special government voting right in the 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.3
12     Ownership structure for up to the 5 most important international 
airports 
1 0.7 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.8 0 1 0.8
E.  Regulation              
14     How are flight slots allocated in airports?  1 0 1 0.5 1 1 1 0.5 1 0.5 0.8
15     How are gate slots allocated in airports?  0.5 0 1 0.5 1 1 1 0.5 1 0.5 0.7
17  Price regulation              
  a. Does the govt regulate airfares? - on domestic routes na 1 0 1 0 0 1 na 1 1 0.6
  - on international routes  0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.3
  If yes to a), is fare discounting allowed? - on domestic routes  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 na 0 0 0
  - on international routes  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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19  Do the licence conditions for foreign-invested  providers who 
establish              
  locally differ from those above?                       
  International air passenger transport (scheduled services)  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0  0 1 0.1
  International air passenger (non-scheduled  charter  services)  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.1
  International air freight (all-cargo carriers, express delivery)  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0  0 1 0.1
  Domestic air transport (scheduled  services)  na 0 0 0 0 0 0 na 0 1 0.1
  Domestic air transport  (non-scheduled charter services)  na 0 0 1 0 0  0 na  0 1 0.3
  Domestic air freight (all-cargo carriers, express delivery)  na 0 0 1 0 0  0 na  0 1 0.3
  Provision of fuel  1 1 na 0 0 1  0 0  0 1 0.4
  Luggage and freight loading and unloading  0 0 0 0 0 1  0 0  0 1 0.2
  Aircraft repair and maintenance  0 0 0 0 0 1  0 0  0 1 0.2
  Selling and marketing of air transport services  0 0 0 0 0 1  0 0  0 1 0.2
  Computer reservation system  0 0 0 0 0 1  0 0  0 1 0.2
20  Does the government subsidize domestic airlines?  1 0 1 1 1 0  0 0  0 0 0.4
21     Has the government covered operational losses of airlines in the 
past ten years  1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3
 
Source: Dee (2009, pp. 42-44). 
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b. Fixed tariffs 
 
c. Legal form 
d. Shareholding 
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employees 
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4. Real estate 
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5. Business 
services 













b. Legal form 
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a. Checking ‘good 
repute’ 
b. Employment agents 
a regulated profession 
c. Licenses for services 
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5.7 Patent and 































































































































































a. Debt collectors 
regulated profession 
b. Or, must be lawyers 
 
‘Other’ comprises legal 
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regulated profession 
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b. Numerous specific 
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Ban on more than one, 









a. Driving instruction 
regulated profession 
b. Managers of driving 
schools regulated 
profession 
c. Separate for 
professional driving 
(taxi, bus, trucks) and 
persons 
 









































* The ‘restrictive impact’ column should be read as follows: A = light, B = more than a nuisance, C = restrictive, anti-
competitive, D = severe hindrance. MS = member state(s). 80 | MUSTILLI & PELKMANS 
Note: For explanation, see text. Section 5 in the table is “business services”. For present purposes, these are defined as 
all the categories in items 5.1–5.8; this excludes accountants and lawyers (insofar as they are not covered by 
specialisations under 5.1–5.8) because the Commission source (2011b) notes that the restrictions applicable to 
them fall under the so-called Art. 15 restrictions legal form, shareholding requirements and limits on multi-
disciplinary activities – see items 3, 4 and 9 in Table 8.  
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